Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia' and 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

10 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division

13099	Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
	A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth

5022	We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7)
	A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

21982	I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
	Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
	From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
	A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

13804	A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1)
	A reaction: This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties.

13805	Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
	A reaction: This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13808	A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: A relation R is essential to x and y (in that order) iff Rxy holds at every world where x and y both exist.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
	A reaction: I find this bizarre. Not only does this seem to me to have nothing whatever to do with essence, but also the relation might hold even though it is a purely contingent matter. All rabbits are a reasonable distance from the local star. Essence of rabbit?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary

13806	Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
	A reaction: He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

13807	A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: P is 'extraneously essential' to x iff it is possessed by x at any world w only in virtue of the possession at w of certain properties by other objects.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
	A reaction: I would say that these are the sorts of properties which have nothing to do with being essential, even if they are deemed to be necessary.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts

13809	One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
	A reaction: Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

13810	The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
	Full Idea: It is widely held that the source of de dicto necessity is in concepts, ..but I deny this... even with simple de dicto necessities, the source of the necessity is to be found in the properties to which the predicates of the de dicto truth refer.
	From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
	A reaction: It is normal nowadays to say this about de re necessities, but this is more unusual.