11103
|
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew up in. We can change it bit by bit, plank by plank.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 5)
|
|
A reaction:
This is an interesting commitment to Strawson's 'revisionary' metaphysics, rather than its duller cousin 'descriptive' metaphysics. Good for Quine. Remember, though, Davidson's 'On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme'.
|
21982
|
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
|
|
Full Idea:
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
|
|
From:
Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
|
|
A reaction:
[Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
|
11092
|
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
A river is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary parts. Identification of the river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is just what determines our subject matter to be a river process as opposed to a river stage.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
So if we take a thing which has stages, but instead of talking about the stages we talk about a single thing that endures through them, then we are talking about a process. Sounds very good to me.
|
11093
|
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
'Red' is surely not going to be opposed to 'Cayster' [name of a river], as abstract to concrete, merely because of discontinuity in geometrical shape?
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 2)
|
|
A reaction:
I've been slow to grasp the truth of this. However, Quine assumes that 'red' is concrete because 'Cayster' is, but it is perfectly arguable that 'Cayster' is an abstraction, despite all that water.
|
11101
|
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
The use of general terms does not commit us to admitting a corresponding abstract entity into our ontology, but an abstract singular term, including the law of putting equals for equals, flatly commits us to an abstract entity named by the term.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Does this mean that in 'for the sake of the children', I have to believe in 'sakes' if I can find a synonym which will substitute for it?
|
13169
|
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
|
|
A reaction:
As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.
|
13170
|
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
|
|
A reaction:
I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concept of identity is central in specifying spatio-temporally broad objects by ostension. Without identity, n acts of ostension merely specify up to n objects. ..But when we affirm identity of object between ostensions, they refer to the same object.
|
|
From:
Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
Quine says that there is an induction involved. On the whole, Quine seems to give a better account of identity than Geach or Wiggins can offer.
|
13167
|
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
|
|
A reaction:
We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.
|