Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Theory of Good and Evil' and 'De Mundo Praesenti'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
12743 A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
     A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
1457 Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: A bare minimum of metaphysical belief about the self is found to be absolutely presupposed in the very idea of morality.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4)
     A reaction: This may not be true of virtue theory, where we could have a whole creature which lacked any sense of personhood, but yet had clear virtues and vices in its social functioning. Even if choices are central to morality, that might not need a self.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
6674 All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I)
     A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
6673 Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: My view, called Ideal Utilitarianism, combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of ethical ends; actions are right or wrong as they produce an ideal end, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I)
     A reaction: I certainly think that if you are going to be a consequentialist, then it is ridiculous to limit the end to pleasure, as it is an 'open question' as to whether we judge pleasures or pains to be good or bad. I am fond of beauty, goodness and truth, myself.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
1458 Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: Absolutely reasonable or unreasonable conduct could not exist in a world which was not itself the product of reason or governed by its dictates.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4)
1459 Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]
     Full Idea: An absolute moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the minds of individual people, so belief in it requires belief in a Mind which contains the ideal and is its source.
     From: report of Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], II.III.I.4) by PG - Db (ideas)