Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Actions' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

19426	'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
	A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

21982	I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
	Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
	From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
	A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19424	Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?

18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas

19427	True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
	A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying

20082	Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
	Full Idea: Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
	From: report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
	A reaction: [compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

19425	In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.