15 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens. |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way. |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46) | |
A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood. |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2) | |
A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of? |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts. |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17) | |
A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me. |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars. |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea. |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20) | |
A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible. |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22) | |
A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding? |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23) | |
A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs. |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it. |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant. |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
Full Idea: One reason why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.19) | |
A reaction: We also do and don't want children to have the same rights as adults. Rights should accrue with development and maturity, it seems. No one thinks sperm and egg have rights. Why stop at 'adult'? Superior adults deserve more rights! |