Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Philosophical Grammar' and 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth'

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11 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4)
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions).
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], p.468), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr'
     A reaction: I would have thought that an algorithm needs some raw material to work with. This leads to the idea that meaning arises from rules of usage.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5)
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Suppose someone were to say: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"?!
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], §127), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason
     A reaction: This reminds us that the concept of supervenience was originally introduced in aesthetics. Beauty is supervenient on physical form. But "Imagine how someone else might look at this butterfly and think it was ugly".