Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'There is No A Priori (and reply)' and 'Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
23505 Aristotelian logic cannot express 'Everyone loves someone' [White,RM]
     Full Idea: There is no way within Aristotelian logic that you can give a proper expression for the logical form of such a proposition as 'Everyone loves someone'.
     From: Roger M. White (Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' [2006], 1 'Frege')
     A reaction: This needs a combination of two different quantifiers.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
     Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character?
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4)
     A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
     Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this.