158 ideas
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
| 21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
| Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
| From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
| A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: We may say that a perceptual concept refers to that entity which normally causes classificatory uses of that concept...but this won't work because such deployments are often caused by things which the concept doesn't refer to. A model might cause 'bird'. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: This rejects the causal theory of perceptual concepts. I like the approach, because classifying things strikes me as absolutely basic to what brains do. To see that x is a bird is to place x in the class of birds. |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
| A reaction: Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view? |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused! |
| 7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The classic manifestation of being able to think about other individuals' mental states is success on the 'false belief test', which requires attribution of mistaken representations to other agents. Children aged three or four can do this. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: There may be an other minds problem, but there is empirical evidence that we can 'read' the minds of others (from their behaviour) even if other animals can't. That seems to be clear, even if folk psychology is fiction, and we make mistakes. |
| 7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: There is debate about whether we attribute beliefs and desires to others, and predict their behaviour, by simulating the decisions we would make ourselves ('simulation-theory'), or by deducing them from some general theory ('theory-theory'). | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: Could be both. If someone is hurt, empathy leads to direct mind-reading (which seems like simulation), but if someone is behaving strangely we may have to bring theories to bear, because this person seems to be different. |
| 7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: It is a mistake to suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other kinds of scientific research. Phenomenal concepts are peculiar, and some of the questions they pose for empirical investigation are peculiar too. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01) | |
| A reaction: This arises from Papineau's Conceptual Dualism, that our concepts are deeply dualist, when the underlying ontology is not. Brain researchers are wise to ignore phenomenology, and creep slowly forward from the physical end, where the concepts are clear. |
| 7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Our phenomenal concepts are irredeemably vague in certain dimensions, in ways that preclude there being any fact of the matter about whether octopuses feel phenomenal pain, or silicon-based humanoids would have any phenomenal consciousness. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §7) | |
| A reaction: It would be hard for Papineau to prove this point, but clearly our imagination finds it very hard to grasp the idea of a thing which is 'somewhat conscious'. The concept of being much more conscious than humans also bewilders us. |
| 7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Our phenomenal concept of consciousness-as-such is a crude tool, lacking theoretical articulation | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
| A reaction: This is a point well made. Given that the human brain is the most complex thing (for its size) in the known universe, we shouldn't expect it to divide up into three or four clear-cut activities. Compare the precision of 'geography' as a concept. |
| 7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: If consciousness is availability for HOT judgements, then cats are not conscious, but if it consists in attention, then they are. I say the concept of consciousness is indefinite between the two, so there is no fact about whether cats are conscious. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.16) | |
| A reaction: Nice point. My personal view is that the question of whether cats are conscious is hopeless because philosophers insist on making consciousness all-or-nothing (e.g. Idea 5786). If I experienced cat mentality, I might say I was 'semi-conscious'. |
| 7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The thesis of 'representational theories of consciousness' is that a creature is conscious just in case it is in a certain kind of representational state, some state which represents in a certain way. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002]) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Harman, Dretske and Tye] The immediate impediment I see to this view is the extreme difficulty of explaining what the special 'way' is that turns representations into consciousness. Some mental states are not representational, and vice versa. |
| 7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The 'actualist' HOT theory says that a state is conscious if the subject is 'aware' of it, where this is understood as a matter of the subject forming some actual Higher-Order judgement about it. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11) | |
| A reaction: As stated there seems an obvious regress problem. Is the consciousness in the mental state, or in the higher awareness of it? If the former, how does being observed make it conscious? If the latter, what gives the higher level its consciousness? |
| 7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Actualist HOT theories face an awkward problem with memory judgements: ...how can an earlier mental state be rendered conscious by some later act of memory? As when I see a red pillar box with no higher-order judgement, and then recall it later. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11) | |
| A reaction: [See 7886 for 'Actualist' HOT theories] This is not altogether absurd. A red pillar box could be somewhere in my field of vision, and then I might suddenly become conscious of it (if it moved!). Police interrogation reminds me of what I only glimpsed. |
| 7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The 'dispositional' HOT thesis says that a state is conscious just in case it could have been the subject of an introspective Higher-Order judgement, even if it wasn't actually so subject. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Dennett and Carruthers for this view] This is designed to meet other problems, but it sounds odd. Does it really make no difference whether higher-judgement actually occurs? How can conscious events be distinguished once they've gone? |
| 7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Dispositional Higher-Order judgeability will be present in some cases which the empirical methodology catalogues as not conscious (as when a subject denies having heard a sound, or seen a bird). | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13) | |
| A reaction: (This attacks Idea 7887) This confirms my intuition, that we can be quite unconscious of things which can still be recalled at a later date. Of course, one could always challenge the reliability of the subject's report in such a case. |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation between mind and brain would be like nothing else in nature. After all, science recognises no other examples of 'causal danglers', ontologically independent states with causes but no effects. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This would be a good enough reason for me to reject the epiphenomenalist view, even if I thought it was a coherent proposal. Insofar as it proposes the existence of something (mind) with no causal powers at all, it strikes me as nonsense. |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Even if conscious decisions did not contribute causally to the actions normally attributed to them, they would still presumably be the causes of the sounds I make when I later report my earlier conscious decisions. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a good reply to my view (borrowed from Dennett - Idea 7379), that epiphenomalism proposes an absurdity (an entity with no causal powers). But if mind can cause speech, why could it not cause arm movements? |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Role concepts can be of two kinds: they can name whichever property realises the role, or they can name the higher property which constitutes the role. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.2 n1) | |
| A reaction: This points strikes me as being crucial to discussions of mental functions. Perhaps labels of Realising Properties and Constituting Properties would help. Analytical philosophy rules. |
| 7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: If causes are basic particulars, then the causal argument won't carry you to the identity of conscious and physical properties, since this only requires them to be instantiated in the same particular, not that the properties are themselves identical. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: [See Idea 7857; Papineau is rejecting the Davidson view] This explains how Davidson reaches a token-token identity view. Can two events occur in the same particular at the same moment? Depends what you mean by a 'particular'. |
| 7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: I would argue that any benefits offered by the notion of supervenience are more easily gained simply by identifying mental properties directly with higher-order properties or disjunctions of physical properties. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: Those who talk of supervenience seem to me to have retreated into a mystery that is not far from substance dualism. We want the explanation of a supervenience. If you accompany me everywhere, I think you are stalking me, or are tied to my ankle. |
| 7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Without the completeness of physics, there is no compelling reason to identify the mind with the brain. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 7) | |
| A reaction: Papineau says the completeness of physics was accepted from the 1950s. Why were Epicurus and Hobbes physicalists? Do we have a circularity here? How do you establish the completeness of physics, without asserting mind to be physical? |
| 7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Mind-brain reductions are less explanatory than characteristic reductions in other areas of science, ...because phenomenal concepts have no special associations with causal roles. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: This may always have some truth in it, but I would expect reductive accounts in the far future to get much closer to giving explanations of phenomenal experience. We can't work down from the phenomenal end, but we can work up from the physical/causal end. |
| 20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Weak reduction of mind requires only that mental causes be identified with physical causes. A strong reduction requires also that the laws by which such causes operate follow by composition from non-special laws. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 3 n8) | |
| A reaction: I'm cautious about laws, but I still vote for strong reduction. No new principles are needed to make a mind from a brain. |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Many effects that we attribute to conscious causes have full physical causes. But it would be absurd to suppose that these effects are caused twice over. So the conscious causes must be identical to some part of those physical causes. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [Papineau labelled this the Causal Argument] Of course two causes can combine to produce an effect, and there can be redundant physical overcausation, but in general I think this is a good argument. |
| 7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: We should be ontological monists, but we should be conceptual dualists. We need to recognise a special phenomenal way of thinking about conscious properties, if we are to dispel the confusions that persuade us that conscious properties cannot be material. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01) | |
| A reaction: This idea came to me as a revelation, and strikes me as spot on. We have developed conceptual dualism simply because humans cannot directly see that their thinking is actually physical brain activity. Thought seems ungrounded, and utterly different. |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: While there is indeed a before-after difference in Mary, this is just a matter of coming to think in new ways, and acquiring a new concept. There is no new experiential property. She could think about the property perfectly well, using material concepts. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: I think it is better to talk of Mary encountering a new mode of experiencing something, just as experience becomes blurred when glasses are removed. No one acquires new 'knowledge' of blurred objects when they remove their glasses. |
| 7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Thinking about something doesn't require activating some version of it. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §5) | |
| A reaction: E.g. I can discuss 'red' without visualising it. This observation strikes me as simple and basic to what thinking is. Papineau thinks that confusion about this simple point leads to major errors in the philosophy of mind. |
| 7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Conscious states clearly affect our bodily movements. But surely anything that so produces a material effect must itself be a material state. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
| A reaction: This is Papineau's simplest possible statement of what he calls the Causal Argument, which he considers to be a knock-down argument for materialism. I agree, but it is really only an intuition. You never know... |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Broadness of content is sometimes defended purely on intuitive grounds, but it is also a corollary of most reductive accounts of representation, including standard teleosemantic and causal accounts. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002]) | |
| A reaction: (For Causal and Teleosemantic views, see Idea 7871, Idea 7872) Presumably a causal/purposeful relationship would only make sense if both halves of the relationship were specified. I suspect this is obscured by over-simplifications. Cf Idea 6634! |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: How can 'broad contents', which hinge on matters outside your head, exert a causal influence on your bodily movements? Surely your bodily movements are causally influenced solely by matters inside your skin, not by how matters are outside you. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This supports my suspicion that there are some extremely simplistic interpretations of the Twin Earth case floating around. If Putnam means by 'elm' whatever experts mean, it is still his idea of what counts as an expert view. |
| 7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The verificationist sin is to infer an indefiniteness of answers immediately from the undecidability of questions. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.02) | |
| A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dummett's anti-realism. It strikes me that what is being described really is a sort of arrogance, in believing that reality can somehow be inferred from studying the epistemic apparatus of a few miserable little mammals. |
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The teleosemantic view of perceptual concepts is that the referential value of the concept can be equated with those items which it is the biological function of the concept to track. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: This seems to work quite nicely for 'bird', which is concept which is used to track birds. It might even work for complex entities, or abstract entities, or even negative entities. Imagination must play a role in that last one. |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Basing content on possible worlds that result in truth leaves no room for thoughts about genuine impossibilities, since there are not possible worlds whose actuality would make an 'impossible thought' true. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: Negative existentials like 'no rabbits in this room' and 'no snakes in this room' seem to have the same truth conditions as well. I suppose the sentences must be translated into a logical form which suits the theory, with negation stuck on the end. |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The content of our thoughts can be equated with those possible worlds whose actuality would make the thought true. On this model, a true thought is one whose content includes the actual world, while a false thought is one whose content does not. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: This is the possible worlds semantics version of truth conditions theories of meaning. Papineau offers a nice difficulty for the theory (Idea 7869). Dummett says the whole approach is circular, because content precedes truth. |
| 7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Any serious theory of the mind-brain must explain whether it thinks of causation in terms of events, facts, or states of affairs. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
| A reaction: I instantly prefer events, simply because they can be specified a little more precisely than the other two. Since cause has a direction in time, it would be nice to specify the times of its components, and events have times. |
| 7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: One view of causes is that they are facts, or instantiations of properties (maybe by particulars, making them 'Kim-events'); the alternative view is that causes themselves are basic particulars ('Davidson-events'). | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: Like Papineau, I incline to the Kim view. It is too easy for philosophers to treat key ideas as unanalysable axioms of thought. An event typically has components and features. It is a contingent matter whether there are any events. |
| 20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: There is no knock down argument for the completeness of physics. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 7) | |
| A reaction: This is commendably honest, given that he pins his view of the mind on it. He makes the case sound overwhelming, though. The thing which would breach the completeness is like the Loch Ness monster - you can't prove it isn't there, if it hides. |
| 20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: We can accept determinism without accepting physical determinism, and so without accepting the completeness of physics. ...We can have a deterministic model in which sui generis mental forces play an essential role. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 3) | |
| A reaction: Papineau cites (on p.241) the 18th century biologist Robert Whytt as an example of this view. |
| 20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: In the 1950s a great deal became known about biochemical and neurophysiological processes, especially at the level of the cell, and none of it gave any evidence for the existence of special forces not found elsewhere in nature. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], A 6) | |
| A reaction: Papineau says that this plus the conservation of energy makes the closure of physics faily conclusive. I would think the similar failure of modern research into the brain to find evidence of weird forces strengthens the case. |
| 20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The conservation of energy is apparently violated by 'wave collapses' in quantum systems. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], A 7 n15) | |
| A reaction: One could imagine it being a little harder to verify the conservation of energy at the quantum levels, where particles and anti-particles pop in and out of existence. I've been wondering why there is some suspicion of collapses. |