44 ideas
| 4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The Social Turn is as defining a characteristic of contemporary philosophy as the Linguistic Turn has been of the earlier twentieth century period. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: A helpful observation. It ties in with externalism about concepts (Twin Earth), impossibility of Private Language, and externalism about knowledge. |
| 4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist. |
| 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If the definition of a circle is based on 'locus of a point', this tells us what a circle is, and it does so by revealing its generating principle, what it takes for a circle to come into being. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: Lowe says that real definitions, as essences, do not always have to spell out a 'generating principle', but they do in this case. Another approach would be to try to map dependence relations between truths about circles, and see what is basic. |
| 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Defining an ellipse in terms of the oblique intersection of a cone and a plane (rather than in terms of the sum of the distance between the foci) gives us a necessary property, but not the essence, because the terms are extrinsic to its nature. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: [compressed wording] Helpful and illuminating. If you say some figure is what results when one thing intersects another, that doesn't tell you what the result actually is. Geometrical essences may be a bit vague, but they are quite meaningful. |
| 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: An entity's essence is just what that entity is, revealed by its real definition. This isn't a distinct entity, but either the entity itself, or (my view) no entity at all. ..We should not reify essence, as that leads to an infinite regress of essences. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: The regress problem is a real one, if we wish to treat an essence as some proper and distinct part of an entity. If it is a mechanism, for example, the presumably a mechanism has an essence. No, it doesn't! Levels of explanation! |
| 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Is it true that we cannot say, non-circularly, what red is? We cannot find a complex synonym for it, but I think we can provide red with an ostensive real definition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite sure how 'real' this definition would be, if it depends on observers (some of whom may be colourblind). In what sense is this act of ostensions a 'definition'? You must distinguish the colour from the texture or shape. |
| 4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: A map that is identical in all respects with that which is mapped is just useless. So reductionism is not just a good thing - it is essential to thought. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: A useful warning, when thinking about truth. It is folly to want your thoughts to exactly correspond to reality. I want to understand the world, but not if it requires being the world. |
| 4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Dangerous nonsense. This leaves truth shifting as our theories change, it leads to different truths in different cultures, and no palpable falsehood in ignorant cultures. Don't give it house-room. |
| 4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Weak alethic relativism holds that while a statement may be true in one framework, it is inexpressible in another. Strong alethic relativism is where a sentence is true relative to one framework, but false relative to another. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The weak version will be Kuhn's 'incommensurability' of scientific theories, while the strong version will be full Protagorean relativism, saying all beliefs are true. |
| 4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Logical relativism emerges if one defends the existence of two or more rival systems that one may legitimately choose between, or move back and forth between. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: All my instincts rebel against this possibility. All of Aristotle's and Kant's philosophy would be rendered meaningless. Obviously you can create artificial logics (like games), but I believe there is a truth logic. (Pathetic, isn't it?) |
| 4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Suggestions for a third value for truth are "indeterminate", or a scale running from "true", through "mostly true", "mainly true", "half true", "mainly false", "mostly false", to "false", or maybe even "0.56 true". | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Anything on a sliding scale sounds wrong, as it seems to be paracitic on an underlying fixed idea of 'true'. "Indeterminate", though, seems just right for the truth of predictions ('sea-fight tomorrow'). |
| 4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: While Russell and Whitehead used five primitive logical symbols in their system, Wittgenstein suggested in his 'Tractatus' that this be reduced to one. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This certainly captures why Russell was so impressed by him. In retrospect what looked like progress presumably now looks like the beginning of the collapse of the enterprise. |
| 21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
| Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
| From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
| A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
| 4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The anti-realist says we have theories about the world that are incompatible with each other, and irreducible to each other. They often cite wave-particle duality, which postulate incompatible properties to reality. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Most physicists, of course, hate this duality, precisely because they can't conceive how the two properties could be real. I say realism comes first, and the theories must try to accommodate that assumption. |
| 4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: What counts as a fact partly depends on human input, such as the availability of concepts to describe such facts. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: The point must be taken. I am happy to generalise about 'The Facts', meaning 'whatever is the case', but the individuation of specific facts is bound to hit the current problem. |
| 4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Those defending the claim that objects exist with identity conditions not imposed by us, do not have to say that there is just one account of those objects possible. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, but the test question is whether the mind of God contains a single unified theory/account. Are multiple accounts the result of human inadequacy? Yes, I surmise. |
| 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is a metaphysically necessary truth, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects (of what a bronze statue and a lump of bronze are) that when it exists a bronze statue coincides with a lump of bronze, which is numerically distinct from it. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: I think it is nonsense to treat the lump and statue as two objects. It is essential that a statue be made of a lump, and essential that a lump have a shape, so to treat the lump and the shape as two different objects is a failure to grasp the essence. |
| 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is a metaphysical possibility, obtaining in virtue of the essences of such objects, that the same bronze statue should coincide with different lumps of bronze at different times. (..they have different persistence conditions). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: If the fame of a statue were that it had been made by melting down the shield of Achilles (say), then the bronze it was made of would be its most important feature. Essences are more contextual than Lowe might wish. |
| 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: All that grasping an essence amounts to is understanding a real definition, that is, understanding a special kind of proposition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
| A reaction: He refuses to 'reify' an essence, and says it is not an entity, so he seems to think that the definition is the essence, but Aristotle and I take the essence to be what is picked out by the correct definition - not the definition itself. |
| 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Explanation is a multifaceted one, with many species (logical, mathematical, causal, teleological, and psychological), ..so it is not a notion fit to be appealed to in order to frame a perspicuous account of essence. That is one species of explanation. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: This directly attacks the core of my thesis! His parenthetical list does not give types of explanation. If I say this explanation is 'psychological', that says nothing about what explanation is. All of his instances could rest on essences. |
| 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If knowledge of essence were by acquaintance of a special kind of entity, we would doubt our ability to grasp the essence of things. For what faculty could be involved in this special kind of acquaintance? | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
| A reaction: This is Lockean empirical scepticism about essences, but I take the view that sometimes you can be acquainted with an essence, but more often you correctly infer it from you acquaintance - and this is just what scientists do. |
| 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If logically necessary truths are consequences of the laws of logic, then I think they are only a proper sub-class of the class of metaphysically necessary truths. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
| A reaction: The problem for this is unusual and bizarre systems of logic, or systems that contradict one another. This idea is only plausible if you talk about the truths derived from some roughly 'classical' core of logic. 'Tonk' won't do it! |
| 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: By 'metaphysical' necessity I mean necessity of the strongest possible kind - absolute necessity - and I take it to be an objective kind of necessity, rather than being something mind-dependent. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
| A reaction: See Bob Hale for the possibility that 'absolute' and 'metaphysical' necessity might come apart. I think I believe in metaphysical necessity, but I'm uneasy about 'absolute' necessity. That may be discredited by the sceptics. |
| 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: 'Epistemic' necessity is more properly to be called 'certainty'. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1) | |
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Surely I can be totally certain of a contingent truth? |
| 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we can truly affirm that it is part of the essence of some entity that p is the case, then p is an essential truth and so a metaphysically necessary truth. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: This feels too quick. He is trying to expound the idea (which I like) that necessity derives from essences, and not vice versa. Is it a metaphysical necessity that there are no moths in my wardrobe, because mothballs have driven them away? Maybe. |
| 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary truth is a truth which is either an essential truth or a truth that obtains in virtue of the essences of two or more distinct things. Hence all metaphysical necessity is grounded in essence. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: Lowe is endeavouring to give an exposition of the approach advocated by Kit Fine. I divide necessities 'because of' things (such as essences) from necessities 'for' things, such as situations or events. |
| 4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: A weaker form of relativism holds that developments in logic, in maths and in geometry have shown how a relativised notion of the a priori is possible. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is non-Euclidean geometry, and multiple formalisations of logic. Personally I don't believe it. You can expand these subjects, and pursue whimsical speculations, but I have faith in their stable natural core. Neo-Platonism. |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we explicate the notion of metaphysical necessity in terms of the notion of essence, rather than vice versa, this may enable us to dispense with the language of possible worlds as a means of explicating modal statements. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: This is the approach I favour, though I am not convinced that the two approaches are in competition, since essentialism gives the driving force for necessity, whereas possible worlds map the logic and semantics of it. |
| 4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The reason sense-data were immune from doubt was because they were so primitive; they were unstructured and below the level of conceptualisation. Once they were given structure and conceptualised, they were no longer safe from sceptical challenge. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: The question of whether sense-data are conceptualised doesn't have to be all-or-nothing. As concepts creep in, so does scepticism, but so what? Sensible philosophers live with scepticism, like a mad aunt in the attic. |
| 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: I suspect that 'intuitions' and 'hunches' are pretty much the same thing, and pretty useless as sources of knowledge. …Things that seemed intuitively true to our forebears a century or two ago often by no means seem intuitively true to us now. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept this. Intuitions change a lot over the centuries because the reliable knowledge which informs intuitions has also changed a lot. Arguments and evidence may nail individual truths, but coherence must rest on intuition. |
| 4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The two dichotomies which set the agenda in contemporary epistemology are the foundationalist-coherentist debate, and the internalist-externalist debate. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Helpful. Roughly, foundationalists are often externalists (if they are empiricists), and coherentists are often internalists (esp. if they are rationalists). An eccentric combination would make a good PhD. |
| 4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Internalism about justification says that the reasons one has for a belief must be in some sense available to the knowing subject, ..while externalism holds that it is possible for a person to have a justified belief without having access to the reason. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me that internalists are talking about the believer being justified, and externalists talk about the belief being justified. I'm with the internalists. If this means cats don't know much, so much the worse for cats. |
| 4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Coherentist justification is more than absence of contradictions, and will involve issues like explanatory support and evidential support, and perhaps issues about probability and confirmation too. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Something like this is obviously essential. Is the notion of 'relevance' also needed (e.g. to avoid the raven paradox of induction)? Coherence of justification will combine with correspondence for truth. |
| 4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Ontological relativists are anti-realists in the strong sense; they hold as meaningless the view that our theories carve nature at the joints. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints my disagreement with such relativism, as it seems obvious to me that nature has 'joints', and that we would agree with any sensible alien about lots of things. |
| 4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Contextualist about knowledge say that "to know" means different things in different context. For example, a warehouse may be empty for a furniture owner, but not for a bacteriologist or a physicist. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: There is obviously some truth in this, but we might say that 'empty' is a secondary quality, or that 'empty for furniture' is not relative. We needn't accept relativism here. |
| 4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions. |
| 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The nearest I can get to a quick definition is to say that a concept is a way of thinking of some thing or kind of things, whether or not a really existent thing or kind of things. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2) | |
| A reaction: The focus on 'things' seems rather narrow. Are relations things? He makes concepts sound adverbial, so that there is thinking going on, and then we add 'ways' of doing it. Thinking depends on concepts, not concepts on thinking. |
| 4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Verificationism came under attack from empiricists who were friendly to the banishment of traditional metaphysics, but unfriendly to the analytic-synthetic distinction, on which the idea of a 'factual statement' depended. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept this move because I don't consider the 'facts' to be language-dependent. They are pre-linguistic, they outrun that capacity of our language, and they are available to animals. |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It may be objected that currently prevailing causal or 'direct' theories of reference precisely deny that a thinker must know what it is the he or she is thinking about in order to be able to think about it. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7) | |
| A reaction: Lowe says that at least sometimes we have to know that we are thinking about, so this account of reference can't be universally true. My solution is to pull identity and essence apart. You only need identity, not essence, for reference. |
| 4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me. |
| 4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: In his earlier work, Quine defended the view that no belief (including logic) is in principle unrevisable, but in his later work (1970) he took the conservative view that we would always impute mistranslation rather than deviancy. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I take it he was influenced by Davidson's 'principle of charity'. He says that if someone asserts 'p and not-p', we would assume a misunderstanding of 'and' or 'not'. |
| 4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: It makes sense to think that one could recognise that something is a language without necessarily being able to translate it; cryptographers do this all the time. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Maybe, but cryptographers usually have a lot of context to work with. If we met extraterrestrials if might not be so clear. One can only spot patterns, and crystals have those. |
| 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is not metaphysically necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules, because the natural laws governing the chemical behaviour of hydrogen and oxygen atoms could have been significantly different, so they might not have composed that substance. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: I fear this may be incoherent, as science. See Bird on why salt must dissolve in water. There can't (I suspect) be a law which keeps O and H the same, and yet makes them combine differently. |
| 4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas. | |
| From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: The other problem is trying to find grounds for sticking to the object of one's faith, rather than changing from time to time. |