51 ideas
354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 069b) | |
A reaction: Aristotle also says that prudence (phronesis) makes virtue possible. |
370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
Full Idea: Souls which have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy will live after death without bodies. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 114b) | |
A reaction: Purifying it of what? Error, or desire, or narrow-mindedness, or the physical? |
16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Semantical fact is almost always more interesting than transcendental philosophical fiction. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1 n4) | |
A reaction: An interesting expression of a more sophisticated recent allegiance to linguistic philosophy. There is still a strong allegiance to semantics as a major branch of philosophy, despite caution (e.g. from Nathan Salmon) about its scope. |
350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: When philosophers investigate with the help of the body they are led astray, but through reflection the soul gets a clear view of the facts. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 065c) |
362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
Full Idea: No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than developing a dislike for argument. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 089d) |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: My thesis C says that to specify something or other under which a and b coincide is to specify a concept f which qualifies for this purpose only if it yields a principle of counting for fs. ...I submit that C is false, though a near miss. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.1) |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: My principle C seems unnecessary ...since it is one thing to see how many fs there are...but another to have a perfectly general method. ...One could answer whether this f-compliant is the same as that one, but there are too many ways to articulate it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.8) | |
A reaction: His famous example is trying to count the Pope's crown, which is made of crowns. A clearer example might be a rectangular figure divided up into various overlapping rectangles. Individuation is easy, but counting is contextual. |
13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
Full Idea: I cannot convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of the one to the other, ...or that when you divide one, the cause of becoming two is now the division. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: Lovely questions, all leading to the conclusion that two consists of partaking in duality, to which you can come by several different routes. |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The realist conceptualist may cheerfully admit that the sortal concepts of which we are possessed are the creatures of our interests; …and also that there need be no one way in which we must articulate reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.2) | |
A reaction: Wiggins calls himself a 'realist conceptualist'. In his terminology, I seem to be an 'anti-conceptualist realist'. The issue concerns aspects of reality that extend beyond our concepts. The 99th d.p. of the mass of the electron. |
16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What Conceptualism entails is that, although horses and stars are not inventions or artefacts, in order to single out these things we must deploy a conceptual scheme which has been formed in such a way as to make singling them out possible. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I don't quite see why the 'singling out' role of the concepts is the only one that generates them, or makes them fit for purpose. In general, of course, our conceptual scheme is necessarily a response to our experience of the world. |
16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A Chinese encyclopedia classifies animals as belonging to the Emperor, embalmed, tame, sucking pigs, sirens, fabulous, stray dogs, included in this classification, frenzied, innumerable, drawn with a fine brush, etcetera, or look for afar like flies. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.7 n18) | |
A reaction: [This glorious quotation comes from a story by Borges, first spotted by Foucault] |
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c) | |
A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men. |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a) |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c) | |
A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims. |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a) |
16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A theory of individuation must comprise at least three things: an elucidation of the primitive concept of identity or sameness; what it is to be a substance that persists through change; and what it is for a thinker to single out the same substance. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Metaphysics seems to need a theory of identity, but I am not yet convinced that it also needs a theory of 'individuation'. Never mind, press on and create one, and see how it looks. Aristotle wanted to explain predication too. |
16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Understanding the concepts involved in individuation can only be characterised by reference to observable commerce between things singled out and thinkers who think or find their way around the world precisely by singling them out. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 1) | |
A reaction: I take individuation to be relatively uninteresting, because I understand identity independently of how we single things out, but Wiggins's reliance on sortals implies that the very identity of things in the world is knee deep in mental activity. |
16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The singling out of a substance at a time reaches backwards and forwards to time before and after that time. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is an inferred history and persistence conditions. Sounds fine in a stable world. We assume (a priori?) that any object will have a space-time line for its duration. |
16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: There could be no singling out tout court unless there could be singling out 'as'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: I find this claim baffling. Do animals categorise everything they engage with? Are we unable to engage with something if we have not yet categorised it? Surely picking it out is prior to saying that sort of thing it is? |
16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: To say that x falls under f - or that x is an f - is to say what x is (in the sense Aristotle isolated). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a key claim in Wiggins's main principle. I'm not convinced. He wants one main sortal to do all the work. I don't think Aristotle at all intended the 'nature' of an individual thing to be given by a single sortal under which it falls. |
16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can expect that, for every completely determinate continuant, there will be at least one sortal concept that it falls under and that determines a principle of persistence for it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.4) | |
A reaction: I think he has the 'determines' relation the wrong way round! Being a tiger doesn't determine anything about persistence. It is having that nature and those persistence conditions which make it a tiger. And why does he optimistically 'expect' this? |
16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Among the best candidates to play the roles of sortal and substantial predicates are the natural kind words. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: There is always a danger of circularity with this kind of approach. How do we distinguish the genuine natural kinds from the dubious ones? |
16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Ordinary artefacts are individuated, rather indeterminately and arbitrarily, by reference to a parcel of matter so organised as to subserve a certain function. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) |
16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Nominal essences are unsatisfactory because they fail either of necessity or of sufficiency for membership of the intended kind, they leave unexplained how sortals can evolve, and there is no room for culture or context in our reference to kinds. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [a compression of a paragraph] I would have thought that Locke would just say it is tough luck if nominal essences can't do all these things, because that's just the way it is, folks. |
16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The question 'what is it?' refers to the persistence and lifespan of an entity, and so manifests the identity over time of an entity and its persistence, between persistence and existence, and between its existence and being the kind of thing it is. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The idea that establishing the kind of a thing can do all this work strikes me as false. The lifespan of a 'human' can be between five minutes and a hundred years. Humans have a clear death, but thunderstorms don't. |
16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can say of Hume's church that the present church is the same 'church' as the old parish church but not the same 'building' or the same 'stonework' as the old parish church. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Unconvinced. This seems to make a 'church' into an abstraction, which might even exist in the absence of any building. And it seems to identify a building with its stonework. Wiggins yearns for a neat solution, but it ain't here. |
16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A thing starts existing only once; and in the case of a clock its proper beginning was at about the time when its maker finished it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I love the example that challenges this. Take the clock's parts and use them to make other clocks, then collect them up and reassemble the first clock. If the first clock has persisted through this, you have too many clocks. Wiggins spots some of this. |
16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
Full Idea: The day before the trial the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands. - Which ship is that? - It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking the victims. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 058a) | |
A reaction: Not philosophical, but this is the Ship of Theseus whose subsequent identity, Plutarch tells us, became a matter of dispute. |
16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Dispute might break out between priests who favoured the working ship and antiquarians who preferred the reconstruction. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This captures the contextual nature of the dispute very succinctly. Wiggins, of course, thinks that sortals will settle the matter. Fat chance. |
16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The principle of Leibniz's Law marks off what is peculiar to identity and differentiates it in a way in which transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity (all shared by 'exact similarity, 'equality in pay', etc.) do not. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.2) |
16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Since any definition is an identity, identity itself cannot be defined. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.2 n7) | |
A reaction: This sounds too good to be true! I can't think of an objection, so, okay, identity cannot possibly be defined. We can give synonyms for it, I suppose. [Wrong, says Rumfitt! Definitions can also be equivalences!] |
16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Identity is a primitive notion. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: To be a true primitive it would have to be univocal, but it seems to me that 'identity' comes in degrees. The primitive concept is the minimal end of the degrees, but there are also more substantial notions of identity. |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The famous proof of Barcan Marcus about necessity of identity comes down to simply this: Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus, so if Phosphorus is Hesperus, Phosphorus is necessarily Hesperus. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Since the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus was an a posteriori discovery, this was taken to be the inception of the idea that there are a posteriori necessities. The conclusion seems obvious. One thing is necessarily one thing. |
16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The full Identity of Indiscernibles excludes the existence in this world of a symmetrical object, which is reduced to half of itself by the principle. If symmetrical about all planes that bisect it, it is precluded altogether from existence. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A really nice objection. Do the parts even need to be symmetrical? My eyeballs can't be identical to one another, presumably. Electrons already gave the principle big trouble. |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The notion of sameness or identity that we are to elucidate is not that of any degree of qualitative similarity but of coincidence as a substance - a notion as primitive as predication. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: This question invites an approach to identity through our descriptions of it, rather than to the thing itself. There is no problem in ontology of two substances being 'the same', because they are just one substance. |
16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It is hard or impossible to conceive of Caesar's not being a man (human). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 4.5) | |
A reaction: So is it 'hard' or is it 'impossible'? Older generations of philosophers simply didn't read enough science fiction. Any short story could feature Caesar's failure to be a man. His assassination was a disaster for the Martian invasion of 44 BCE. |
359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
Full Idea: If someone sees a resemblance, but feels that it falls far short of the original, they must therefore have a recollection of the original. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 074e) |
357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
Full Idea: The way in which people react to a geometrical diagram or anything like that is unmistakable proof of the theory of recollection. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 073a) |
9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: We are convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the original ideal which motivates the devotion to a priori knowledge - that it will lead to a 'pure' knowledge, which in Plato's case will be eternal and necessary knowledge, like taking lessons from the gods. Wrong. |
16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What sortal concepts we can bring to bear upon experience determines what we can find there. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Wiggins would wince at being classed among linguistic relativists of the Sapir-Whorf type, but that's where I'm putting this idea. Wiggins is a realist, who knows there are things out there our concepts miss. He compares it to a fishing net. He's wrong. |
15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. Then it befitted a man to investigate only ...what is best. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: A reversal of the modern idea of 'best explanation'. Socrates is citing Anaxagoras's proposal to understand things by interpreting the workings of a supreme Mind. It is the religious version of best explanation. |
13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097a) | |
A reaction: In retrospect it seems surprising that such clever people hadn't worked this one out, given the evidence of anatomy, in animals and people, and given brain injuries. By the time of Galen they appear to have got the answer. |
364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is one soul, even minutely, more or less of a soul than another? Not in the least. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 093b) | |
A reaction: This idea is attractive because unconsciousness and death seem to be abrupt procedures, and so appear to be all-or-nothing, but I would personally view extreme Alzheimer's as an erasing of the soul, though a minimum level of it seems all-or-nothing. |
16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The mind conceptualises objects, yet objects impinge upon the mind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.5) | |
A reaction: A very nice statement of the relationship, and the fact that we don't just make our concepts up. |
16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A 'conception' of horse is a theory of what a horse is, or what it is to be a horse. The conception is in no way the same as the concept. The conception is of the concept. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Wiggins sounds confident about a sharp distinction here, which I doubt, but some such distinction seems to required. I quite like Williams's 'fat' and 'thin' concepts. |
361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality - which it is not. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 084c) | |
A reaction: Do people think that? Most people distinguish subjective from objective. Wounded soldiers are also aware of victory or defeat. |
351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
Full Idea: All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and we want this because of the body, to which we are slave. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) |
13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing, and the condition without which it could not be a cause. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 099c) | |
A reaction: Not as simple as he thinks. It seems fairly easy to construct a case where the immediately impacting event remains constant, and the background condition is changed. Even worse when negligence is held to be the cause. |
369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor force to keep it from falling. The uniformity of heaven and equilibrium of earth are sufficient support. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 108e) |
363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: The theory that our soul exists even before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the soul's possession of the ultimate standard of reality. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 092d) |