Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Testability and Meaning' and 'talk'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

10152	Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski]
	Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales.
	From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic
	A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other?

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

21982	I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
	Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
	From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
	A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

10151	I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
	Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist.
	From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I
	A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

14305	In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap]
	Full Idea: If a wooden match was completely burned up yesterday, and never placed in water at any time, is it not the case, therefore, that the match is soluble (in the truth-functional view). This follows just from the antecedent being false.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (Testability and Meaning [1937], I.440), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions
	A reaction: This, along with Edgington's nice example of the conditional command (Idea ) seems conclusive against the truth-functional account. The only defence possible is some sort of pragmatic account about implicature.