16252
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Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
Since metaphysics doesn't want to assert analytic propositions, nor fall within the domain of physical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified, ..or else combine meaningful words..into pseudo-statements.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language [1959]), quoted by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 2.4
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A reaction:
A classic summary of the logical positivist rejection of metaphysics. I incline to treat metaphysics as within the domain of science, but at a level of generality so high that practising scientists become bewildered and give up.
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21982
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I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
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Full Idea:
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
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From:
Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
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A reaction:
[Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
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16779
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Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
When a piece of wood is divided in two halves, no new substance is generated. But there are now two substances, or the accidents of the two halves would be without a subject. They existed before hand, and were one piece of wood, but not in the same place.
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From:
William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], IV.19), quoted by Richard S. Westfall - Never at Rest: a biography of Isaac Newton 26.2
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A reaction:
A nice example, demonstrating that there are substances within substances, contrary to the view of Duns Scotus. If a substance is just a subject for properties, it is hard to know what to make of this case.
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9102
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If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
It seems possible that the concept of a genus could be abstracted from one individual, let us say, the concept 'animal', as in the case of one approaching from a distance, when I see enough to judge that I am seeing an animal.
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From:
William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q xiii)
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A reaction:
This is a rather individualistic view of abstraction, ignoring the shared language and culture. It is hard to imagine a truly virgin mind coming up with the concept after one encounter. The concept 'mind-boggling' seems more likely.
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