11 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9) | |
A reaction: I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it. |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough. |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
Full Idea: A single belief can trail at once regresses of both sorts: one terminating and one not. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §6) | |
A reaction: This makes foundationalism possible, while admitting the existence of regresses. It is a good point, and triumphalist anti-foundationalists can't just point out a regress and then smugly troop off to the pub. |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11) | |
A reaction: This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing. |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state provides no guarantee against error, then it cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §4) | |
A reaction: That assumes that knowledge entails certainty, which I am sure it should not. On a fallibilist account, a foundation could be incredibly secure, despite a barely imaginable scenario in which it turned out to be false. |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification. |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26) | |
A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important. |
19458 | Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: There is only one evil - egoism; there is only one good - love. ...Love, but truly! All other virtues will automatically come to you. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Fragments on My Philosophical Development [1839], 1834-6) | |
A reaction: This is a rather Christian idea of virtue, coming from the great atheist. Does tough love come from love? |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1 | |
A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer). |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16) | |
A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support. |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment. | |
From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22) | |
A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal. |