17 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Every philosophy originates as a manifestation of its time; its origin presupposes its historical time. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.59) | |
A reaction: There seems to be widespread agreement among continental philosophers about this idea, whereas analytic philosophers largely ignore, and treat Plato as if he were a current professor in Chicago. |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Plato in writing is only a means for me; that which is primary and a priori, that which is the ground to which all is ultimately referred, is understanding. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.63) | |
A reaction: It always seems to that the main aim of philosophy is understanding - which is why its central activity is explanation. |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Every intellectual determination has its antithesis, its contradiction. Truth exists not in unity with, but in refutation of its opposite. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of the 'synthesis' in Hegel, in favour of what strikes me as a rather more sensible interpretation of the modern dialectic. Being exists in contrast to nothingness, and truth exists in contrast to its negation? |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: A thinker is a dialectician only insofar as he is his own opponent. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
A reaction: Quite an inspirational slogan for beginners in philosophy. How many non-philosophers are willing to be their own opponent. In law courts and the House of Commons we assign the roles to separate persons. Hence rhetoric replaces reason? |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Impredicative Definitions are definitions of an object by reference to the totality to which the object itself (and perhaps also things definable only in terms of that object) belong. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], n 13) |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: The urge to communicate is a fundamental urge - the urge for truth. ...That which is true belongs neither to me nor exclusively to you, but is common to all. The thought in which 'I' and 'You' are united is a true thought. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.65) | |
A reaction: Sceptics may doubt that there are such truths, but this is certainly how we experience agreement - that there is some truth shared between us which is no longer the possession of either of us. Nice idea. |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: In the superior realist and simple theory of types, the place of the axiom of reducibility is not taken by the axiom of classes, Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.140-1) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 n3 | |
A reaction: This is Zermelo's Axiom of Separation, but that too is not an axiom of standard ZFC. |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
Full Idea: 'Mathematical Logic' is a precise and complete formulation of formal logic, and is both a section of mathematics covering classes, relations, symbols etc, and also a science prior to all others, with ideas and principles underlying all sciences. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.447) | |
A reaction: He cites Leibniz as the ancestor. In this database it is referred to as 'theory of logic', as 'mathematical' seems to be simply misleading. The principles of the subject are standardly applied to mathematical themes. |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
Full Idea: One may, on good grounds, deny that reference to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it or, in other words, that 'all' means the same as an infinite logical conjunction. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.455) |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
Full Idea: In order to be sure that new expression can be translated into expressions not containing them, it is necessary to have a survey of all possible expressions, and this can be furnished only by syntactical considerations. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.448) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The generalized Continuum Hypothesis says that there exists no cardinal number between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
Full Idea: It has turned out that the solution of certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.449) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the famous result, from the great man himself, in the plainest possible English. |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Classes and concepts may be conceived of as real objects, ..and are as necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions, with neither case being about 'data'. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.456) | |
A reaction: Note that while he thinks real objects are essential for mathematics, be may not be claiming the same thing for our knowledge of logic. If logic contains no objects, then how could mathematics be reduced to it, as in logicism? |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) | |
A reaction: The issue is at what point in building an account of the foundations of mathematics (if there be such, see Putnam) these impure definitions should be ruled out. |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: To sensuous consciousness it is precisely language that is unreal, nothing. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.77) | |
A reaction: Offered as a corrective to the view that our ontological commitments entirely concern what we are willing to say. |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: The Absolute is spirit and nature. ...But what then is the Absolute? Nothing other than this 'and', that is, the unity of spirit and nature. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.82) | |
A reaction: This is Feuerbach's spin on Hegel. He has been outlining idealist philosophy and the philosophy of nature in Schelling. Is this Spinoza's one substance? |
18639 | If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: If we can make sense of a hypothetical insurance market, and find a determinate answer to the question of what insurance people would buy in it, then we could use the tax system to duplicate the results. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (A Matter of Principle [1985]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 2.4.b | |
A reaction: This is a nice alternative from Dworkin to Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' approach. |