Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Habermas' and 'The Condemnation of 1277'

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14 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II)
     A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity.
The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9)
     A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV)
     A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro)
     A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'.
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV)
     A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'.
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially.
     From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V)
     A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
     Full Idea: The Condemnation stipulated that all portions of the ancient intellectual heritage that placed non-logical limits on divine omnipotence were no longer to be tolerated. ...Philosophers now had to entertain the wildest ideas with all seriousness.
     From: report of Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3
     A reaction: Boulter identifies this as 'the ultimate source of Hume's philosophical delirium'. Presumably the angels-on-a-pinhead stuff originated with this. It is crazy to think that the only limit on possible existence is logic. Can God make a planet of uranium?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
     Full Idea: Heresy 151: 'To have certainty regarding any conclusion, it must be founded on self-evident principles'.
     From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], 151), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.3
     A reaction: The correct view is obviously to found certainty on faith and authority. It is one thing to be told that foundationalism is a poor theory, but another to be told it is a heresy, and thus a potential capital crime!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson]
     Full Idea: We do not morally disapprove of people who are incompetent reasoners.
     From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83)
     A reaction: Well, we don't morally disapprove simply of their lack of reasoning ability, but we may morally disapprove of their actions, which have arisen entirely from the disability.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson]
     Full Idea: 'Early to bed and early to rise' is a universalizable maxim, but, though it might be good advice, there is obviously no such obligation.
     From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83)
     A reaction: I take it that Kant's rule won't distinguish moral guidance from prudential guidance. Unfair, I think. I may be a lark, but when I universalise this maxim I see that it can't be willed as a universal rule, because we should tolerate the owls.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Critical theory said that culture unwittingly played the role of an advertisement for the way things are. Horkheimer and Adorno referred to this phenomenon as the 'culture industry'.
     From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.1:04)
     A reaction: An interesting perspective. However, absolutely everything is an advertisement for what it offers. I think this is especially true of moral (and immoral) actions.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)]
     Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that with all the heavenly bodies coming back to the same point after a period of thirty-six thousand years, the same effects as now exist will reappear.
     From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §92)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)]
     Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that what is absolutely impossible according to nature cannot be brought about by God or another agent.
     From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §17)
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)]
     Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life.
     From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §9)