21 ideas
| 16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity. |
| 16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9) | |
| A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck. |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
| A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay? |
| 16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'. |
| 16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
| A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'. |
| 16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
| Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially. | |
| From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V) | |
| A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like. |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
| 5303 | For the proletariate, law, morality and religion are just expressions of bourgeois interests [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Law, morality, religion are to the proletarian so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §1) | |
| A reaction: This Marxist idea has been the main driving force in spreading relativist views through modern culture. There is a lot of truth here, but philosophy is plausibly the search for truths which both the bourgeois and the proletarian will accept. |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
| A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
| 21998 | Bourgeois interests create our morality, law and religion [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Morality, law and religion are bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], p.230), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
| A reaction: The obvious question is whether this creation of values is conscious or unconscious. Personally I believe in conspiracies. Some cynical conversations go on behind the scenes, of which historians will never hear. |
| 5302 | Modern governments are just bourgeois management committees [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §1) | |
| A reaction: In Britain the Labour Party and the Trade Unions have appeared since 1848, but bourgeoisie control of the media has pushed us a long way back towards Marx's time. Government will always be someone's management committee. |
| 5304 | Communism aims to abolish not all property, but bourgeois property [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §2) | |
| A reaction: This is a sinister remark which has led to huge numbers of murders in the Soviet Union and China. People resent having their property 'abolished', especially if they have worked hard for it. But most of our wealth is owned by about 2% of our people. |
| 5307 | Many of the bourgeois rights grievances are a form of self-defence [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §3.II) | |
| A reaction: …so don't try being nice to us. No TRUE bourgeois would actually want to help the proletariate… Nevertheless, he is probably largely right. Do we want the poor to suffer? No. Do we want them to be as rich as us? No! |
| 5306 | The free development of each should be the condition for the free development of all [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: In a communist society we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §2) | |
| A reaction: This ringing slogan is remarkably close to John Stuart Mill's defence of liberalism, where liberty is an absolute, as long as it avoids the liberty of others. Personally I think freedom is marginal in political philosophy, like food and shelter. |
| 5305 | Communists want to rescue education from the ruling class [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Communists seek to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §2) | |
| A reaction: Someone has to control education, and I would personally prefer it if the controllers were well educated themselves. Neutral education is an idle dream. We must educate for democracy, if we really want democracy. |
| 5301 | The history of all existing society is the history of class struggles [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The history of all existing society is the history of class struggles. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The Communist Manifesto [1848], §1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to make, say, the English Peasants' Revolt of 1481 crucial, and the building of Lincoln Cathedral fairly minor. Where does the advent of the telephone figure? Etc. Still, we must concede his point. Most medieval history is about power. |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |