26 ideas
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems that when a proposition is false, something does not subsist which would subsist if the proposition were true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.76) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like a commitment by Russell to the truthmaker principle. The negations of false propositions are made true by some failure of existence in the world. |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle may be stated in the form: If p is denied, not-p must be asserted; this form is too psychological to be ultimate, but the point is that it is significant and not a mere tautology. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.41) | |
A reaction: 'Psychology' is, of course, taboo, post-Frege, though I think it is interesting. Stated in this form the law looks more false than usual. I can be quite clear than p is unacceptable, but unclear about its contrary. |
13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Descartes founded analytic geometry on the assumption that there is a one-one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1 |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: If two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: This is merely an assertion of the realist view, rather than an argument. I take representative realism to tell a perfectly good story that permits two subjective representations of the same object. |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
Full Idea: It may be doubted whether relations can be adequately characterised by anything except the fact that they relate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.27) | |
A reaction: We can characterise a rope that ties things together. If I say 'stand to his left', do I assume the existence of one of the relata and the relation, but without the second relata? How about 'you two stand over there, with him on the left'? |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: In some sense which it would be very desirable to define, a relational proposition seems to be 'about' its terms, in a way in which it is not about the relation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.53) | |
A reaction: Identifying how best to specify what a proposition is actually 'about' is a very illuminating mode of enquiry. You can't define 'underneath' without invoking a pair of objects to illustrate it. A proposition can still focus on the relation. |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
Full Idea: When, after hearing the notes of a melody, I perceive the melody, the notes are not presented as still existing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.31) | |
A reaction: This is a good example, supporting Meinong's idea that we focus on 'intentional objects', rather than actual objects. |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
Full Idea: Only those objects exist which have to particular parts of space and time the special relation of 'occupying' them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.29) | |
A reaction: He excepts space and time themselves. Clearly this doesn't advance our understanding much, but it points to a priority in our normal conceptual scheme. Is Russell assuming absolute space and time? |
16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Descartes thinks it is a pointless relic of scholastic metaphysics to dispute over the boundaries between substances and mere aggregates. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6 | |
A reaction: This is Pasnau's carefully considered conclusion, with which others may not agree. It presumably captures the attitude of modern science generally to such issues. |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II) | |
A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity. |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9) | |
A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck. |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay? |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'. |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'. |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V) | |
A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like. |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
Full Idea: Contingency derives from the fact that a sentence containing a verb in the present tense - or sometimes in the past or the future - changes its meaning continually as the present changes, and stands for different propositions at different times. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.26) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a bad example of the linguistic approach to philosophy. As if we (like any animal) didn't have an apprehension prior to any language that most parts of experience are capable of change. |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I prefer to advocate ...that the object of a presentation is the actual external object itself, and not any part of the presentation at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: Although I am a fan of the robust realism usually favoured by Russell, I think he is wrong. I take Russell to be frightened that once you take perception to be of 'presentations' rather than things, there is a slippery slope to anti-realism. Not so. |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind. |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.22) | |
A reaction: Given that early Russell loads his ontology with properties and propositions, this should come as no surprise, even if J.S. Mill was his godfather. |
4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We have inner awareness of our freedom. | |
From: René Descartes (works [1643]) | |
A reaction: This begs a few questions. I may be directly aware that I have not been hypnotised, but no one would accept it as proof. |
6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Descartes himself was well aware of the interaction problem, and corresponded uncomfortably with Princess Elizabeth on the matter; …he pointed out that gravity is causal despite not being a physical object. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William Lycan - Consciousness n1.3 | |
A reaction: Lycan observes that at least gravity is in space-time, unlike the Cartesian mind. Pierre Gassendi had pointed out the problem to Descartes in the Fifth Objection to the 'Meditations' (see Idea 3400). |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Correct judgements have a transcendent object; but with regard to incorrect judgements, it remains to examine whether 1) the object is immanent, 2) there is no object, or 3) the object is transcendent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.67) | |
A reaction: Why is it that only Russell seems to have taken this problem seriously? Its solution gives the clearest possible indicator of how the mind relates to the world. |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every property of the object seems to demand a strictly correlative property of the content, and the content, therefore, must have every complexity belonging to the object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.55) | |
A reaction: This claim gives a basis for his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth. It strikes me as false. If I talk of the 'red red robin', I don't mention the robin's feet. He ignores the psychological selection we make in abstraction. |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: If p is a false affirmative proposition ...then it seems obvious that if we believe not-p we do know something true, so belief in not-p must be something which is not mere disbelief. This proves that there are negative propositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.75) | |
A reaction: This evidently assumes excluded middle, but is none the worse for that. But it sounds suspiciously like believing there is no rhinoceros in the room. Does such a belief require a fact? |
19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5 | |
A reaction: His dualism is crucial, along with his ontological argument, because they make all mentality supernatural. Remember, for Descartes animals are mindless machines. |
6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
Full Idea: Notoriously, the Cartesian idea that matter is purely geometrical will not do, for it leaves no distinction between matter and empty volumes: a filler for these volumes is required. | |
From: comment on René Descartes (works [1643]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.3 | |
A reaction: Descartes thinks of matter as 'extension'. Descartes's error seems so obvious that it is a puzzle why he made it. He may have confused epistemology and ontology - all we can know of matter is its extension in space. |