27 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
Full Idea: In Peirce's system, a super-ordinate discipline provides general laws or principles for subordinate disciplines, which in turn provide concrete examples of those general laws. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 1 'System' | |
A reaction: Does he really mean that subordinate disciplines have no principles or laws? That can't be right. |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: In Peirce's naturalist view of truth, it is a catch-all for the particular local aims of enquiry - empirical adequacy, predictive power, coherence, simplicity, elegance, explanatory power, a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness, great understanding. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 1 | |
A reaction: The aims I cited in my thesis on explanation. One given, for me, is that truth is an ideal, which may or may not be attainable, to varying degrees. It is just what thinking aims at. I suspect, though, that these listed items have one thing in common. |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: Peirce was not in the slightest bit tempted by the thought that a belief is true if it is useful. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 | |
A reaction: All students of the pragmatic theory of truth should start with this idea, because it rejects the caricature view of pragmatic truth, a view which is easily rebutted. James seems to have been guilty of this sin. |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
Full Idea: Two related worries about Peirce's account of truth are (from Royce) what are we to make of truth if enquiry never reaches an end, and (from Russell) what are we to make of truth if enquiry ends prematurely? | |
From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'issues' | |
A reaction: The defence of Peirce must be that the theory is not holistic - referring to the whole Truth about absolutely everything. The discovery of the periodic table seems to me to support Peirce. In many areas basic enquiry has reached an end. |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], CP5.567), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'separation' | |
A reaction: [Dated 1902] Maybe we should identify a huge branch of human learning as Hyptheticals. Professor of Hypotheticals at Cambridge University. The trouble is it would have to include computer games. So why does maths matter more than games? |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: Peirce takes bivalence not to be a law of logic, but a regulative assumption of enquiry. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 n10 | |
A reaction: I like this. For most enquiries it's either true or not true, it's either there or it's not there. When you aren't faced with these simple dichotomies (in history, or quantum mechanics) you can relax, and allow truth value gaps etc. |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'. |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates. |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.16 | |
A reaction: If this is anti-realism, then I don't like it. If it is realist, then it is probably a bit on the optimistic side (if you think about cultures that are into witchcraft and voodoo). |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It was Peirce and Schröder in the nineteenth century who began a systematic taxonomy of relations. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], 4) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4 |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
Full Idea: The realism about possibilities, generalities, tendencies and habits that we find in Peirce's later maxim is something that the logical positivists would have been uncomfortable with. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'Concl' | |
A reaction: Atkin examines the various later statements of the earlier maxim, given here in Idea 21490. Ryle and Quine express the empiricist and logical positivist approach to dispositions. |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised. |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?' |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance. |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi) | |
A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right. |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting. |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd. |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in. |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts. |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities? | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The possible is necessarily general ..It is only actuality, the force of existence, which bursts the fluidity of the general and produces a discrete unit. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 13.1 | |
A reaction: [Papers 4 1967:147] This was quoted by Prior, and is often cited. Recanati is interested in the notion of a singular thought being tied to actuality, by generating a mental file. |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Inquiry is not standing upon a bedrock of fact. It is walking up a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay until it begins to give way. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], CP 5.589), quoted by Gottfried Leibniz - Letter to Newton 4 | |
A reaction: [I don't know which article this lovely quote comes from] |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
Full Idea: Korsgaard argues for the ultimate dependence of final value on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent. | |
From: report of Christine M. Korsgaard (Creating the Kingdom of Ends [1992]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.3 n4 | |
A reaction: This hyper-Kantian view doesn't strike me as very plausible. Not philosophical theory which entirely cuts animals out of the story has much appeal for me. |