64 ideas
421 | Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B035), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5 | |
A reaction: …which invites the question 'Is there anything that a wisdom-seeker should NOT be interested in?' |
1491 | Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B116), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.06 | |
A reaction: This is true. When people are labelled as incapable of philosophy (e.g. by Plato), it is just that they are slow developers. |
5863 | Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Although reason exists forever, men are foolish. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1407b | |
A reaction: The despair of all philosophers (e.g. Plato) who think reason is the easiest thing in the world, and stares everyone in the face, and yet people seem to spurn this supreme gift from the gods. They needed the optimism of the career teacher. |
414 | Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Although the universal law (logos) is common to all, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B002), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.133.4- | |
A reaction: Heraclitus mentions 'logos' in just three fragments - this one, and Idea 15660 and Idea 424. |
425 | A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists of opposing tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B051), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.2 | |
A reaction: Like squabbling couples who resent outside intervention. The remark suggests the virtues of 'dialectic', and may get to the heart of what philosophy is. |
416 | Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the beautiful harmony. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1155b04 |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of. |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
Full Idea: One map of Sussex is like another, but it is not true of that other map, but only of the county. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: One might question whether a map is in any sense 'true' of Sussex, though one must admit that there are good and bad maps of Sussex. The point is a nice one, which shows that there is no simple account of truth as correspondence. |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Logic studies the way in which one thing follows from another, in which one thing is compatible with another, contradicts, corroborates or necessitates another, is a special case of another or the nerve of another. And so on. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: I presume that 'and so on' would include how one thing proves another. This is quite a nice list, which makes me think a little more widely about the nature of logic (rather than just about inference). Incompatibility isn't a process. |
1312 | If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The remark of Heraclitus that all things are and are not effectively renders all assertions true, and that of Anaxagoras that there is an intermediary between assertion and negation makes all assertions false. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1012a | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 416. Heraclitus is discussing truth-value 'gluts', as in paraconsistent logic, and Anaxagoras is discussing truth-value 'gaps', as in three-valued Kleene logic. |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'. |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates. |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are many sentences which do not state facts, while there are no facts which (in principle) could not be stated. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Hm. This seems like a nice challenge. The first problem would be infinite facts. Then complex universal facts, beyond the cognizance of any mind. Then facts that change faster than thinking can change. Do you give up yet? Then there's.... |
15658 | The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The hidden harmony is stronger (or 'better') than the visible. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B055), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.5 | |
A reaction: 'An unapparent connection [harmonia] is stronger than an apparent one' is Curd's translation. I'm taking this for essentialism. It is the basic idea of the essentialising child (see Gelman). The hidden explains the apparent. |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised. |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?' |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance. |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi) | |
A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right. |
13782 | Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Cratylus 402a | |
A reaction: This is as good a summary of the Heraclitus view of things as any, and Plato appears to present it as a verbatim quotation. |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting. |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd. |
11853 | A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The mixed drink, of wine, cheese and barley, separates if it is not stirred. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B125) | |
A reaction: Wiggins quotes this, because it seems to be Heraclitus struggling to decide what sortal his drink falls under. I take it to be a problem of vagueness, since separation and mixing occur along a continuum, like a sorites. |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in. |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts. |
427 | It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to step twice into the same river. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B091), quoted by Plutarch - 24: The E at Delphi 392b10- |
11091 | You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis 1 | |
A reaction: This seems to make Quine a 'perdurantist', committed to time-slices of objects, rather than whole objects enduring through change. |
2064 | If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: According to Heracliteans, since things must be changing, and since lack of change can't be a property of anything, then everything is always undergoing change of every kind. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030) by Plato - Theaetetus 182a |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities? | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The theory of Representative Ideas begs the whole question, by assuming a) that we can know these 'Ideas', b) that we can know the realities they represent, and c) we can know a particular 'idea' to be representative of a particular reality. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Personally I regard the ideas as immediate (rather than acquired by some knowledge process), and I am dimly hoping that they represent reality (or I'm in deep trouble), and I am struggling to piece together the reality they represent. I'm happy with that. |
430 | Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B107), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.126 |
1500 | When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Since when we sleep the senses are closed, mind is separated from its surroundings and loses the power of memory. When we wake the mind re-contacts the world, and regains the power of reason. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.130 |
417 | Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Donkeys prefer chaff to gold. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B009), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1176a07 |
426 | Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Sea-water is the purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B061), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.5 |
431 | Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger makes satisfaction good, weariness makes rest good. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B111), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.178 |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Those who find 'judgments' everywhere and propositions nowhere find that some judgments cohere whereas others are incoherent. What is the status of the terms between which these relations hold? | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this strikes me as a nice point. I presume Russell after 1906 is the sort of thinker he has in mind. |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
Full Idea: It is argued by Husserl and (virtually) by Meinong that only if there are such entities as objective Meanings - and propositions are just a species of Meaning - is there anything for Logic to be about. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: It is presumably this proposal which led to the scepticism about meanings in Wittgenstein, Quine and Kripke. The modern view, which strikes me as right, is that logic is about inference, and so doesn't need a subject-matter. |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
Full Idea: If I have uttered my sentence aloud, a listener can both understand what I say or grasp my meaning, and also infer to my state of mind. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: This simple observations seems rather important. If we shake written words onto the floor, they might add up to a proper sentence, but half of the point of a sentence is missing. Irony trades on the gap between meaning and state of mind. |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
Full Idea: As the orthodox terms 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are equivocal, since they may equally well denote 'thinkings' as 'what-is-thought', the 'accusatives' of acts of thinking have come to be called 'propositions'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], I) | |
A reaction: I have understood propositions to be capable of truth or falsity. 'What is thought' could be a right old jumble of images and disjointed fragments. Propositions are famous for their unity! |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
Full Idea: We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV) | |
A reaction: Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion. |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Although we speak of thinking in French, we never talk of knowing or believing or opining in French. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute') | |
A reaction: Once again Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but he does it rather well, and offers good support for my belief in propositions. I love this. 'I know, in French, a bank where the wild thyme blows'. |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
Full Idea: There are no substantial propositions...There is just a relation between grammatical structure and the logical structure of facts. 'Proposition' denotes the same as 'sentence' or 'statement'. A proposition is not what I think, but what I think or talk in. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: The conclusion of Ryle's discussion, but I found his support for propositions much more convincing than his critique of them, or his attempt at an alternative linguistic account. He never mentioned animals, so he self-evidently hasn't grasped the problem. |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
Full Idea: All the arguments for the subsistence of true propositions seem to hold good for the subsistence of false ones. We might even have to find room for absurd or nonsensical ones like 'some round squares are not red-headed'. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: A particularly nice example of a Category Mistake from the man who made them famous. Why can't we just make belief a proposition attitude, so I equally believe 'sea is blue', 'grass is pink' and 'trees are bifocal', but the status of my belief varies? |
429 | To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: To God, all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B102), quoted by Porphyry - Notes on Homer Il.4.4 | |
A reaction: The idea that all things are actually 'just' strikes me as nonsense. I also don't think I can get my head round the idea that everything is actually good and beautiful. Must try harder. |
12294 | Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus said that good and evil are the same thing. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], 58/102) by Aristotle - Topics 159b32 | |
A reaction: Heaven knows what he meant by this, though it sounds suspiciously like moral nihilism. Maybe Heraclitus was not a very nice man. Or is the thought a more sophisticated one, in line with Nietzsche's remarks about cultural morality? |
419 | If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there is no trail leading to it and no path. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B018), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 2.17.4 | |
A reaction: The best remark about hope I have ever encountered. Usually they are empty platitudes. |
415 | If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: If happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B004), quoted by Albertus Magnus - On Vegetables 6.401 | |
A reaction: But surely oxen are happy when they find some good vetch? Presumably, though, they are not 'eudaimon'. What is the complete fulfilment of life for an ox? |
5155 | It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B085), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1105a08 | |
A reaction: 'Emotion' is the Greek word 'thumos'. "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it", said Oscar Wilde. Heraclitus underestimates how very good many modern people are at dieting. |
433 | For man character is destiny [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: For man character is destiny. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B119), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.40.23 | |
A reaction: This is the extreme opposite of Sartre's existentialist claim that we can entirely change ourselves. Personally I am with Heraclitus, though I don't see why our destined character shouldn't be modified (e.g. by education). |
422 | The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B044), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2 | |
A reaction: This may be the first recorded assertion of the rule of law, and hence of the separation of powers. We still have plenty of people who reject this principle. |
614 | Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus claimed that from time to time everything becomes fire. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1067a |
424 | Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: When you have listened, not to me but to the law (logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B050), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.1 |
5096 | Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 204b37 | |
A reaction: Modern cosmology says that Heraclitus was right (pretty much). If we say 'energy' instead of 'fire' (which may be what he meant), then he is absolutely spot-on. |
17539 | The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: If we replace Heraclitus's word 'fire' by the word 'energy' we can almost repeat his statements word for word from our modern point of view. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 | |
A reaction: My problem has always been that I have no idea what 'energy' is, so I'm none the wiser. |
3054 | Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus taught that fire when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete, becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to earth, and this is the road down. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.1.6 |
15660 | Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: All things come into being according to this Law ('logos'), ...and I expound theories (words) and processes (actions) separating each thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B001), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.133 | |
A reaction: I like the fact that things are separated according to their natures (particulars!), and not that natures are somehow bestowed on individuals. |
12269 | All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All things are in a state of motion. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b22 | |
A reaction: This seems right, I would say. It seems to make a 'process' the fundamental category of ontology, rather than an 'object'. |
420 | The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: This cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled and quenched in measure. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.1.103 |
1499 | Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: According to Heraclitus we become intelligent by drawing on divine reason. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.129 |
15659 | Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: They purify themselves by staining themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad if any of his fellow-men should perceive him acting thus. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Origen - Against Celsus 7.62 |
1501 | In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: In their ignorance of the true nature of gods and heroes people pray to these statues, which is like someone holding a conversation with a house. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Anon (Pyth) - Theosophia Tubigensis 68 |