Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence' and 'On Liberty'

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45 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is natural nowadays to think of variables as a certain kind of sign, but I wish to think of them as a certain kind of object.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §2)
     A reaction: Fine has a theory based on 'arbitrary objects', which is a rather charming idea. The cell of a spreadsheet is a kind of object, I suppose. A variable might be analogous to a point in space, where objects can locate themselves.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
     Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
     A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'.
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
     Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
     A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
     Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
     A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
     Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
     Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
     A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised.
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
     Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
     A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?'
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
     Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
     A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance.
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
     Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi)
     A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
     Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
     A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
     Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
     A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
     Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
     A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
     Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
     Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
     A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
     Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference.
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
     A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
     Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities?
     From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In traditional abstraction, the colour green merely has the intrinsic property of being green, other properties of things being abstracted away. But why should that be regarded as a type? It must be because the property is common to the instances.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §5)
     A reaction: A nice question which shows that the much-derided single act of abstraction is not sufficient to arrive at a concept, so that abstraction is a more complex matter (perhaps even a rational one) than simple empiricists believe.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In abstracting from the elements of a doubleton to obtain 2, we do not wish to abstract away from all features of the objects. We wish to take account of the fact that the two objects are distinct; this alone should be preserved under abstraction.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §3)
     A reaction: This is Fine's strategy for meeting Frege's objection to abstraction, summarised in Idea 9146. It seems to use the common sense idea that abstraction is not all-or-nothing. Abstraction has degrees (and levels).
We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Number abstraction can be taken to be a special case of abstraction in general, which can then be defined without recourse to the concept of number.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §3)
     A reaction: At last, a mathematical logician recognising that they don't have a monopoly on abstraction. It is perfectly obvious that abstractions of simple daily concepts must be chronologically and logically prior to number abstraction. Number of what?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In Cantor's abstractionist account there can only be two numbers, 0 and 1. For abs(Socrates) = abs(Plato), since their numbers are the same. So the number of {Socrates,Plato} is {abs(Soc),abs(Plato)}, which is the same number as {Socrates}!
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §1)
     A reaction: Fine tries to answer this objection, which arises from §45 of Frege's Grundlagen. Fine summarises that "indistinguishability without identity appears to be impossible". Maybe we should drop talk of numbers in terms of sets.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill]
     Full Idea: The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This principle (based on knowing your own dispositions) is a very good account of the ethics drunkenness. We have a moral duty to know and remember our own dispositions. Violent people should avoid arguments as well as alcohol.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill]
     Full Idea: I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Mill, writing in praise of personal liberty, is desperate to introduce a paternalistic element into his politics, and the 'maximisation of happiness' will justify such paternalism, while his basic liberal principle (Idea 7211) won't. Mill's Dilemma.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill]
     Full Idea: Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: If I should not even think about evil deeds, then neither should you. I would prevent you if I could. I would prevent you from drinking yourself to death, if I could. It is just that intrusions into private lives leads to greater trouble.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill]
     Full Idea: The will of the people practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Hence the nicely coined modern phrase 'the silent majority', on whose behalf certain politicians, usually conservative, offer to speak. It is unlikely that the silent majority are actually deeply opposed to the views of the very active part.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill]
     Full Idea: Government interference should be restricted because of the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This would need justification, because it might be replied that individuals should not have unnecessary power either. The main problem is that governments have armies, police and money.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill]
     Full Idea: Government power should be restricted because things are often done better by individuals.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This contains some truth, but it is obvious that innumerable things can be done better by governments, and also (and more importantly) that innumerable other good things might be done by governments which individuals can't be bothered to do.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill]
     Full Idea: The safest practical ideal is to aim for the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is a very nice principle, which I would think desirable within an institution as well as on the scale of the state. I am becoming a fan of Mill's politics. I still say that freedom is an overrated virtue, so efficiency must be underrated.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: For Mill the greatest happiness will be achieved by giving people a private sphere of interests where no intervention is permitted, while allowing a public sphere where intervention is possible, but only on utilitarian grounds.
     From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Liberty'
     A reaction: This is probably standard liberal practice nowadays. Freely consenting adult sexual activity is agreed to be wholly private. At least some lip-service is paid to increasing happiness when government intervenes.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill]
     Full Idea: A people accustomed to transacting their own business is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: He makes reference to Americans. This is an important idea, because it shows that democratic control is not just a matter of elections (which can be abolished or suborned), but is also a characteristic of a certain way of life.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill]
     Full Idea: The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others; his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is the key idea in Mill's liberalism, though he goes on to offer some qualifications of this absolute prohibition. I don't disagree with this principle, but there may be a lot more indirect harm than we realise (eg. in allowing liberal sex or drugs).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill]
     Full Idea: The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, opposed to any idea that we should abandon our own value to that of our state. I agree, but communitarians can subscribe to this too, while disagreeing that maximum freedom is the strategy to follow.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill]
     Full Idea: The strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is also a well known objection to capital punishment. Generalised, well established, legal interferences are perhaps more likely to get it right than ad hoc decisions about individuals by individual officials.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill]
     Full Idea: Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: There is a Victorian (and Enlightenment) optimism here which a glimpse of the freedoms of the early twenty-first century might dampen. I doubt if Mill expected British tabloid newspapers, or porn on cable TV. Education and freedom connect.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill]
     Full Idea: Mill has presented liberty as instrumentally valuable, as a way of achieving the greatest possible happiness in society. But perhaps he should have argued that liberty is an intrinsic good, good in itself.
     From: comment on John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic'
     A reaction: If freedom is intrinsically good, does this leave us (as Wolff warned earlier) unable to defend its value? Freedom isn't an intrinsic good for infants, so why should it be so for adults? Good because it brings happiness, or fulfils our nature?
Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Utilitarianism provides an account of what liberties we should and should not have. Mill argues we should be free to compete in trade, but not to use another's property without consent. Thus he sets limits to liberty, while paying it great respect.
     From: report of John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Intrinsic'
True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill]
     Full Idea: The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This principle will probably lead up a Prisoner's Dilemma cul-de-sac. The only freedom which deserves the name is the collective agreed freedom of a whole community to live well, when citizens volunteer to restrict their individual freedoms.
Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill]
     Full Idea: All restraint, qua restraint, is an evil.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: The ultimate justification for this is (presumably) utilitarian, but that would mean that there was nothing wrong with restraint if the person did not mind, or was not aware of the restraint. What is intrinsically wrong with restraint?
Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill]
     Full Idea: My first maxim is that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is a key idea of liberalism, and one which communitarians have doubts about (because it is almost impossible to perform an action which is of no interest, in the short or long term, to others). I share these doubts.
Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill]
     Full Idea: An official could turn a person back from an unsafe bridge without infringeing their liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Seems fair enough, but it justifies paternalist interference. The tricky one is where the official and the citizen disagree over what the citizen 'truly' desires. Asking people may involve too much time, but it could also involve too much effort.
Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill]
     Full Idea: A person being free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house, lies on the exact boundary line between two principles, of toleration and of restraint.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Nothing illuminates a philosopher's principles more than for them to specify cases that lie on their borderlines. Both professions seem, unfortunately, to lead people into worse activities, such as violent bullying, or theft. Tricky..
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
     Full Idea: My second maxim is that for actions that are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and subject to social or legal punishment, if society believes that this is requisite for its protection.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: (wording compressed). The trouble with this would seem to be the possible disagreement between the individual and the society over whether the actions actually are prejudicial to others. It would justify a conservative society in being repressive.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill]
     Full Idea: It is often desirable that beneficial things should be done by individuals, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This raises the important danger, which even those on the political left must acknowledge, of the 'nanny state'. It offers a nicely paternalistic, and even patronising reason for giving people freedom, just as a parent might to a child.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill]
     Full Idea: Individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves diversity of education; a general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being particularly true with the advent in Britain of the National Curriculum in the early 1990s. However, if there is a pressure towards conformity in state education, private education is dominated by class and money.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill]
     Full Idea: To bestow a life on someone which may be either a curse or a blessing, unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is the standard utilitarian attitude to engendering people. I think I have to agree. It is no argument against this to say that we value people with poor life prospects, once they have arrived. Altruism towards children may disguise selfish parents.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill]
     Full Idea: To extract from the Gospel a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible withouth eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people.
     From: John Stuart Mill (On Liberty [1857], Ch.2)
     A reaction: 'Barbarous' has a quaint Victorian ring to it, but his point is that the surviving teachings of Jesus are very thin and generalised. Christians would do better to expand their implications, than to borrow from the Old Testament.