8242
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Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3)
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A reaction:
Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity.
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8223
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The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Those who criticise without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the continental view of analytical philosophy, that it is pathetically conservative. I would offer MacIntyre as a response, who gives a beautiful analysis of why the super-modern view is dead. The French are hopelessly romantic.
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22353
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One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
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A reaction:
This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.
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22356
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An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
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A reaction:
This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).
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22359
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Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.
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22360
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The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
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A reaction:
This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.
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22362
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Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
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A reaction:
[They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.
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22364
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Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
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A reaction:
[summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.
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8224
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'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
'Eris' is the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia, the divinity of union and friendship.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.2 n)
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A reaction:
Are these actual gods? This interestingly implies that the wonders of dialectic and Socrates' elenchus are simply aspects of friendship, which was elevated by Epicurus to the highest good. The Greeks just wanted wonderful friends and fine speeches.
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17518
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Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
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Full Idea:
If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope.
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From:
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
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A reaction:
This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'.
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17510
|
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
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Full Idea:
If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much.
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From:
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
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A reaction:
Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?'
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
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Full Idea:
The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite.
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From:
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
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A reaction:
It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd.
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22357
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The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
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From:
Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
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A reaction:
[H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.
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8222
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Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
If one concept is 'better' than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys (survole) us.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
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A reaction:
I don't get much of that, but it is certainly in tune with the Kuhn/Feyerabend idea that what science can generate is fresh visions, rather than precisely expanded truths. Personally I consider it dangerous nonsense, but I thought I ought to pass it on.
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8248
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Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion)
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A reaction:
The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology?
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8245
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The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force).
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6)
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A reaction:
[Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool?
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