Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Scientific Objectivity' and 'reports'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

22353	One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
	A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.

22356	An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).

22359	Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.

22360	The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
	A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.

22362	Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
	A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.

22364	Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
	A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts

17518	Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
	Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
	A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'.

17516	If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
	Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
	A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

17520	Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
	Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
	A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

17519	To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
	Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

17511	Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
	Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
	A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised.

17510	Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
	Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
	A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?'

17522	We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
	Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
	A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance.

17515	Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
	Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi)
	A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

17517	Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
	Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
	A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

17513	If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
	Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
	A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

17523	Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
	Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
	A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

17521	You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
	Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')

17514	Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
	Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')
	A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity

17509	Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
	Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference.
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
	A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

17512	If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
	Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities?
	From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob')

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment

22357	The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
	A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

22365	The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
	From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule

7350	The Torah just says: do not do to your neighbour what is hateful to you [Hillel the Elder]
	Full Idea: What is hateful to you, do not unto your neighbour: this is the entire Torah. All the rest is commentary - go and study it.
	From: Hillel the Elder (reports [c.10]), quoted by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II
	A reaction: Johnson suggests that this idea, of stripping everything from the Torah except its basic morality, was passed on to Jesus by Hillel. Suppose you hate Arsenal, but your neighbour supports them, and they just won the European Cup? What should you do?