41 ideas
9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: The notion that philosophy can be done cooperatively, in the manner of scientists or engineers engaged in a research project, seems to me absurd. And yet few philosophers can survive in isolation. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' [1987], xxi) | |
A reaction: This why Nietzsche said that philosophers were 'rare plants'. |
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The plummet touches the bottom of the sea now at a greater depth, now at a less, but is bound to reach it somewhere sooner or later; the study of this inexplicable devolves upon metaphysics. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1) | |
A reaction: This definition of metapysics contains the germ of despair about the subject. Does he hope that metaphysicians can explain what nobody else can? |
9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: You do not improve the truth value of a false proposition by calling attention to a coherent system of propositions of which it is one. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' [1987], xi) | |
A reaction: We need to disentangle the truth-value from the justification here. If it is false, then we can safely assume that is false, but we are struggling to decide whether it is false, and we want all the evidence we can get. Falsehood tends towards incoherence. |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'. |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates. |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Thing in itself signifies that which exists independently of our perception, that which actually is; …to Kant it was '= x'; to me it is will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IV:61) | |
A reaction: Does he mean his own will, which is plausible since he has direct experience of it, or is he referring will in general - whatever that is? |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised. |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?' |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance. |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi) | |
A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right. |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting. |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd. |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in. |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts. |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities? | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is power. The devil it is! One man can have a great deal of knowledge without its giving him the least power, while another possesses supreme authority but next to no knowledge. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:43) | |
A reaction: He is referring to Bacon's famous adage. Bacon may be right about military affairs, but not about politics. |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A dictate of reason is the name we give to certain propositions which we hold to be true without investigation, and of which we think ourselves so firmly convinced we should be incapable of seriously testing them even if we wanted to. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:12) | |
A reaction: This is closer to the cautious way modern thinkers are inclined to express the idea. Even Quine would be reasonably happy with this. |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The fundament upon which all our knowledge and learning rests is the inexplicable. It is to this that every explanation, through few or many intermediary stages, leads. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1) | |
A reaction: This is obviously true, and the only question is whether it is a necessary or a contingent truth. |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: One might almost believe that half our thinking takes place unconsciously.. Usually we arrive at a conclusion without having clearly thought about the premises which lead to it. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:40) | |
A reaction: Schopenhauer was a major pioneer of this crucial idea. I'm beginning to think it is much greater than a half. |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Thoughts come not when we want but when they want. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:37) | |
A reaction: One of my favourite Nietzsche ideas originated in Schopenhauer! |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The entire property of a concept consists in nothing more than what has been begged and borrowed from perceptual knowledge, which is the true and inexhaustible source of all insight. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:9) | |
A reaction: Schopenhauer is usually seen as a sort of idealist, but this is a full endorsement of the empirical view of concepts, to which I largely subscribe. Note that he talks of 'knowledge', rather than of 'experience'. |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The central problem of aesthetics is how satisfaction with and pleasure in an object are possible without any reference thereof to our willing. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], II:415), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: This does seem a good distinction. We can divide pleasures into willed and unwilled. Compare thinking that some remote stranger (in a photograph) is very beautiful, with falling in love with someone. |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In the beautiful we always perceive the intrinsic and primary form of animate and inanimate nature, that is to say Plato's Ideas thereof. …When an aesthetic perception occurs the will completely vanishes from consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIX:205) | |
A reaction: An essential Schopenauer idea. Iris Murdoch said something similar. |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man is at bottom a dreadful wild animal. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:114) | |
A reaction: As an example he cites the slave owners in the United States. |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: As a rule we find pleasure much less pleasurable, pain much more painful than we expected. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:149) | |
A reaction: Never go on holiday with Schopenhauer. This is more accurate about pain, I think. |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: As a botanist can recognise the whole plant from one leaf, …so an accurate knowledge of a man's character can be arrived at from a single characteristic action. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:118) | |
A reaction: Very true. Great novelists specialise in such observations. One word can reveal a character, as well as one action. |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Chinese name five cardinal virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom and honesty. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110) | |
A reaction: I like politeness being on the list, though it seems rather superficial to be a virtue of character. Respect would be better. |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Because of their profounder ethical and metaphysical insight, the Buddhists start not with the cardinal virtues but with cardinal vices, …which are lust, sloth, wrath and avarice (and maybe hatred). | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110) | |
A reaction: This may be right. Our lives are affected much more by the vices of others than by their virtues, and most virtuous behaviour aims at rectifying the bad effects of other people's vices. |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Only in the cleverest animals such as dogs and apes does the need for activity, and with that boredom, make itself felt. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:50) | |
A reaction: But it is much more frequently young creatures, of almost any kind, that seek constant activity, and get continually restless. The most active adults need not be the cleverest. |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Human life must be some kind of mistake. ...Boredom is a direct proof that existence is in itself valueless, for boredom is nothing other than the sensation of the emptiness of existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XI:146) | |
A reaction: I think it is a good advertisement for existentialism that it makes something more out of boredom than Schopenhauer does. |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The state is essentially no more than an institution for the protection of the whole against attacks from without, and the protection of its individual members from attacks by one another. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:123) | |
A reaction: He then has a swipe at Hegel for his inflated idea of the importance of the state. Schopenhauer is close to Hobbes on this one. |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Poverty and slavery are only two forms - on might almost say two words for - the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's energies are expended for the most part not on his own behalf but on that of others. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:125) | |
A reaction: The modern world is full of people who righteously despise slavery, but think only of the poor that it serves them right. |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Freedom of the press must be regarded as a permit to sell poison. …I very much fear, therefore, that the dangers of press freedom outweigh its usefulness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:127) | |
A reaction: On the whole the modern world disagrees with this view, but watching the popular press in Britain in the last twenty years has made me sympathise with Schopenhauer. |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Perhaps there is no one alive who would not already have put an end to his life if this end were something purely negative, a sudden cessation of existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIII:158) | |
A reaction: Nonsense, on the whole, but it is a nice question how many people would do it if it only took a painless instant. |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If the act of procreation were neither the outcome of a desire nor accompanied by feelings of pleasure, but a matter to be decided on the basis of purely rational considerations, is it likely the human race would still exist? | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156) | |
A reaction: This is almost certainly correct in the modern world. In tougher economic circumstances people seem desperate to have children who will help them survive. |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Religion is the only means of introducing some notion of the high significance of life into the uncultivated heads of the masses. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XV:174) | |
A reaction: Cf Philip Larkin's poem 'Church Going'. On the whole Schopenhauer didn't actually believe that our lives had any 'high significance'. |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Creator created not only the world, but also created possibility itself; therefore he should have created the possibility of a better world than this one. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156) | |
A reaction: This is explicitly a response to Leibniz's claim that the Creator selected the best of all possible worlds from the available options. The Euthyphro Question hovers here: must the Creator accept what is possible (the platonic view), or create possibility? |