35 ideas
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2) |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21) |
15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Kripke has a semantic theory of truth which has inspired promising axiomatic theories of truth. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 01.2 | |
A reaction: Feferman produced an axiomatic version of Kripke's semantic theory. |
15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: One of the most popular semantic theories of truth is Kripke's theory. It describes a class of models which themselves involve a truth predicate (unlike Tarski's semantic theory). | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.3 | |
A reaction: The modern versions explored by Horsten are syntactic versions of this, derived from Feferman's axiomatisation of the Kripke theory. |
14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
Full Idea: Kripke established that, contrary to the prevalent Tarskian dogma, attributions of truth do not always force a move to a metalanguage. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975], 5.1) by Anil Gupta - Truth | |
A reaction: [Gupta also cites Martin and Woodruff 1975] |
14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
Full Idea: Kripke showed via a fixed-point argument that certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Anil Gupta - Truth | |
A reaction: [Gupta also cites Martin and Woodruff 1975] It is an odd paradox that truth can only be included if one adds a truth-value of 'neither true nor false'. The proposed three-valued system is 'strong Kleene logic'. |
16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Kripke's main contribution was …his classification of the different consistent fixed points and the discussion of their use for discriminating between ungrounded sentences, paradoxical sentences, and so on. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 15.1 |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'. |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates. |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same universe. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], V §91), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: We can accept that the universe itself does not contain contradictions (how could it), but it is a leap of faith to say that all monads represent the universe well enough to avoid contradictions. Maps can contradict one another. |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the ratio of two lines L and M is conceived as abstracted from them both, without considering which is the subject and which the object, which will then be the subject? We cannot say both, for then we should have an accident in two subjects. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th Paper, §47), quoted by John Heil - Relations 'External' | |
A reaction: [compressed] Leibniz is rejecting external relations as having any status in ontology. It looks like a mistake (originating in Aristotle) to try to shoehorn the ontology of relations into the substance-properties framework. |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?' |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance. |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi) | |
A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right. |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised. |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting. |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd. |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in. |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts. |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities? | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS) |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24) |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04) |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2 | |
A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance. |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14) |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4) |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49) |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6) |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argues that if time is a thing in itself, and God is 'in' time, then God would be dependent for His existence on the existence of time. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Newton' | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz says time is merely relations between events. Not sure what he thinks an event is. What is God made of? Is there some divine matter upon which God's existence must depend? |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By this principle alone, that there must be a sufficient reason why things are thus rather than otherwise, I prove the existence of the Divinity, and all the rest of metaphysics or natural theology. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |