27 ideas
| 23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: And of responsible actions, some are done through habit, some through desire, and of these some through rational and some through irrational desire. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1369a01) | |
| A reaction: Identified by Michael Frede, to illustrate reason having its own distinctive type of desire ('Boulesis'). I suspect that the rational desires are the morally good desires. |
| 5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It belongs to dialectic to survey equally all kinds of syllogism. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355a08) | |
| A reaction: Since dialectic is central to philosophy, this implies that philosophers ought to be students of logic. This duty seems to me to be taken more seriously in the analytical tradition than in the 'continental' tradition. |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| Full Idea: There are two related but distinguishable questions concerning proper names: what the speaker denotes (upon an occasion), and what the name denotes. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
| A reaction: I don't think any account of language makes sense without this sort of distinction, as in my favourite example: the password is 'swordfish'. So how does language gets its own meanings, independent of what speakers intend? |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| Full Idea: We need an account of what makes an expression into a name for something that will allow names to change their denotations. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
| A reaction: Presumably an example would be 'The Prime Minister is in the building'. Evans proposes to discuss communication, rather than strict meanings and descriptions. |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| Full Idea: Intentions alone don't bring it about that a name gets a denotation; without the intention being manifest there cannot be the common knowledge required for the practice. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
| A reaction: Well, I might have a private name for some hated colleague which I mutter to myself whenever I see her. The way names, and language generally, becomes ossified is by joining the great impersonal sea of the language. ..waves of bones, |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| Full Idea: Change of denotation is decisive against the Causal Theory of Names. Changes of denotation actually occur: a hearsay report misunderstood by Marco Polo transferred the name 'Madagascar' from a portion of the mainland to the African island. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't sound decisive, as you could give an intermediate causal account of Marco Polo's mistake. I might take the famous name Winston, and baptise my son with it. And I might have done it because I thought Winston was a German dictator. |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
| From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
| 5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we have a single counter-instance, the argument is refuted as not necessary, even if more cases are otherwise or more often otherwise. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1403a07) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle (pioneering hero) pointing out what we now tend to think of as Karl Popper's falsification, the certain way to demonstrate the falseness of a supposed law of nature, by finding one anomaly from it. |
| 5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody is on his guard against a disease that nobody has yet caught. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1372a27) | |
| A reaction: A beautifully simple indication of one problem with induction. In a dangerous situation, you can't wait around for a few experiences in order to learn the regularities and rules. Either you are doomed, or you must explain using related experiences. |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| Full Idea: In general, a speaker intends to refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a theory of reference which fully preserves the spirit of traditional empiricism. Speakers refer to ideas which connect to the source of their underlying impressions. |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| Full Idea: A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
| A reaction: This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery? |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| Full Idea: The strong thesis (that descriptions are sufficient for reference) is outrageous. It would mean that if Mr X is wrongly introduced to me as Mr Y, then I truly say 'this is Mr Y' if X overwhelmingly satisfies descriptions of Y. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
| A reaction: [I omit some qualifying phrases] Evans says that probably no one ever held this view. It seems right. In the case of an electron it would seem that all the descriptions could be the same, except space-time location. Same electron as yesterday? |
| 5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and of the study of ethics, and is quite properly categorized as political. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1356a25) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle gives a higher status to rhetoric than Socrates and Plato did - and rightly, in my view. We have lost sight of it as a vital part of politics, and philosophers must fight for virtue in rhetoric, which requires right reason and fine principles. |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| Full Idea: Sometimes we use expressions with the overriding intention to conform to the use made of them by some other person or persons. I shall say we use the expression 'deferentially'; examples might be 'viol' or 'minuet'. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II) | |
| A reaction: I presume Evans wasn't very musical. This label sounds useful, if you wish to connect Grice's account of meaning with Putnam's externalist account of concepts, where deference to experts is crucial. Is all linguistic usage deferential? |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| Full Idea: I think the Principle of Charity (maximise true beliefs) is unacceptable. The acceptable principle enjoins minimizing the attribution of inexplicable error and cannot be operated without a theory of the causation of belief for the creatures investigated. | |
| From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I) | |
| A reaction: The normal principle of charity certainly seems on shaky ground if you think you have encountered a fairly normal tribe, when they in fact are in possession of the weirdest belief system on the entire planet. |
| 5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The pentathletes are the most beautiful, being at the same time naturally suited to both speed and force. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1361b09) | |
| A reaction: This is still true. Watch the Olympics. The bodies we envy most belong to those who do a variety of disciplines. The most beautiful music fulfils a variety of functions (structure, as well as melody, drama, rhythm, harmony, novelty). |
| 5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The body is in its prime from the ages of thirty to thirty-five, and the soul around the age of forty-nine. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390b09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderfully specific! It is important that Aristotle is interested in these questions. The good for man follows the path laid out by nature, in which a man rises to his highest good in maturity, and then declines from it into old age. |
| 5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is something of which we all have an inkling, being a naturally universal right and wrong, even if there should be no community between the parties or contract. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1373b07) | |
| A reaction: This is the strongest assertion I know of in Aristotle of an absolute moral standard, independent of natural function. It makes Aristotle an intuitionist, and is strikingly opposed to contracts as the most basic aspect of morality. |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The elements of happiness are: gentle birth, many virtuous friends, wealth, creditable and extensive offspring, a comfortable old age; also health, beauty, strength, size and competitiveness, reputation, status, luck and the virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1360b18) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's pluralism, and his commitment to 'external goods' (rather than the inner good of pure virtue, which the Stoics preferred). 'Gentle birth' might turn out to mean good upbringing and education. Who was the most 'beautiful' philosopher? |
| 5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One's own interest is a relative good, nobility a good absolutely. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1389b37) | |
| A reaction: The key idea in the whole of Greek moral theory is the concept of what we can call a 'beautiful' action. Such things, or course, tend to be visible in great actions, such as sparing an enemy, rather than the minutiae of well-mannered daily life. |
| 5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The greatest virtues must be those most useful to others. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1366b02) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if this applies to the intellectual virtues, as well as to the social virtues? Is this virtue theory's answer to utilitarianism, or utilitarianism's answer to virtue theory? Personally I think good persons are prior to benefits. |
| 5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If one used strength, health, wealth and strategic expertise well, one might do the greatest possible good and if badly the greatest possible harm; this is a problem common to all good things, except virtue. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355b04) | |
| A reaction: Of course, this may just be a tautology about virtue, rather than an empirical observation. However, in 'Ethics' he tries to describe a state of mind (essentially one of harmony) which could never result in misuse. |
| 5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Old men are prone to pity, but where the young are so from philanthropy, the old are so from weakness, for they think all these things are near for themselves to suffer. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390a18) | |
| A reaction: I am shocked to find Aristotle being so cynical. I see no reason why the old should not be as philanthropic as anyone else, and they clearly are so, as when they plant trees for future generations to enjoy. |
| 5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The character of the rich man is that of the mindlessly happy one. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1391a12) | |
| A reaction: Very nice. It is hard to deny that the rich tend to be happy (in some sense of the word), and recent sociological research has tended to demonstrate this, but the pursuit of wealth must inevitably take the focus away from key intellectual pursuits. Yeh? |
| 5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are four types of constitution: democracy (whose purpose is freedom), oligarchy (for wealth), aristocracy (for education and customs), and monarch or tyranny (for security). | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1365b28-37) | |
| A reaction: An aristocracy seems to be the guardians of tradition and culture (as in an English public school education). The tyranny of Hitler and Stalin did not exactly lead to security. Democracy and aristocracy are the front-runners. Compare Idea 2821. |
| 1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies and not to come to terms with them. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1367a19), quoted by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.189 |
| 5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men take its occurring after as its occurring because. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1401b30) | |
| A reaction: The Latin is 'post hoc propter hoc' - after this so because of this. It is quite a good inductive rule, but obviously open to abuse, as in legal cases, as when someone happens to acquire a lot of money just after a crime. |