18946
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Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
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Full Idea:
As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
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From:
Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
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A reaction:
Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
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7946
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The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
The memory criterion for personal identity permits 'branching' (where two things can later meet the criteria of persistence of a single earlier thing), which presents it with serious problems.
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From:
report of Bernard Williams (Personal Identity and Individuation [1956]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.4
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A reaction:
Of course, any notion of personal identity would have serious problem if people could branch into two, like fissioning amoeba. If that happened, we probably wouldn't have had a strong notion of personal identity in the first place. See Parfit.
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3654
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The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely.
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4313
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Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
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Full Idea:
Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire).
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172
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A reaction:
A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond.
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23989
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There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
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Full Idea:
Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them.
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From:
report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence'
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A reaction:
[not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list.
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