29 ideas
| 8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
| Full Idea: If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money then time is money then time is money then if time is money then time is money. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.95) | |
| A reaction: Quine offers this with no hint of a smile. I reproduce it for the benefit of people who hate analytic philosophy, and get tired of continental philosophy being attacked for its obscurity. |
| 8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A definition endows a word with complete determinacy of meaning relative to other words. But we could determine the meaning of a new word absolutely by specifying contexts which are to be true and contexts which are to be false. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.89) | |
| A reaction: This is the beginning of Quine's distinction between the interior of 'the web' and its edges. The attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction will break down the boundary between the two. Surprising to find 'absolute' anywhere in Quine. |
| 10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
| Full Idea: Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.327) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5 | |
| A reaction: [Musgrave quotes a long chunk of Quine which is hard to compress!] Effectively, he says If-thenism is cheating, or begs the question, by eliminating whole sections of perfectly good mathematics, because they cannot be derived from axioms. |
| 20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: Quine argues that logic could not be established by conventions, since the logical truths, being infinite in number, must be given by general conventions rather than singly; and logic is needed in the meta-theory, to apply to individual cases. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935]) by Georges Rey - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 3.4 | |
| A reaction: A helpful insight into Quine's claim. If only someone would print these one sentence summaries at the top of classic papers, we would all get far more out of them at first reading. Assuming Rey is right! |
| 8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
| Full Idea: If logic and mathematics being true by convention says the primitives can be conventionally described, that works for anything, and is empty; if the conventions are only for those fields, that's uninteresting; if a general practice, that is false. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.102) | |
| A reaction: This is Quine's famous denial of the traditional platonist view, and the new Wittgensteinian conventional view, preparing the ground for a more naturalistic and empirical view. I feel more sympathy with Quine than with the other two. |
| 8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
| Full Idea: If logic is to proceed mediately from conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions. Conventions for adopting logical primitives can only be communicated by free use of those very idioms. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.104) | |
| A reaction: A common pattern of modern argument, which always seems to imply that nothing can ever get off the ground. I suspect that there are far more benign circles in the world of thought than most philosophers imagine. |
| 9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
| Full Idea: When a convention is incapable of being communicated until after its adoption, its role is not clear. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.106) | |
| A reaction: Quine is discussing the basis of logic, but the point applies to morality - that if there is said to be a convention at work, the concepts of morality must already exist to get the conventional framework off the ground. What is it that comes first? |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
| From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
| 8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Geometry can be brought into line with logicism simply by identifying figures with arithmetical relations with which they are correlated thought analytic geometry. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.87) | |
| A reaction: Geometry was effectively reduced to arithmetic by Descartes and Fermat, so this seems right. You wonder, though, whether something isn't missing if you treat geometry as a set of equations. There is more on the screen than what's in the software. |
| 8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We can construe geometry by 1) identifying it with algebra, which is then defined on the basis of logic; 2) treating it as hypothetical statements; 3) defining it contextually; or 4) making it true by fiat, without making it part of logic. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.99) | |
| A reaction: [Very compressed] I'm not sure how different 3 is from 2. These are all ways to treat geometry conventionally. You could be more traditional, and say that it is a description of actual space, but the multitude of modern geometries seems against this. |
| 8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
| Full Idea: To claim that mathematical truths are conventional in the sense of following logically from definitions is the claim that mathematics is a part of logic. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.79) | |
| A reaction: Quine is about to attack logic as convention, so he is endorsing the logicist programme (despite his awareness of Gödel), but resisting the full Wittgenstein conventionalist picture. |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules. |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances. |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V) | |
| A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance? |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side. |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI) | |
| A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them. |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
| A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
| A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
| A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
| A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
| A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
| A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
| A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality. |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
| A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional). |