3 ideas
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of one. There is the one which is convertible with being, which adds nothing to being except being undivided; and this deprives of multitude. Then there is the principle of number, which to the notion of being adds measurement. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de Potentia Dei [1269], q3 a16 ad 3-um) | |
A reaction: [From a lecture handout] I'm not sure I understand this. We might say, I suppose, that insofar as water is water, it is all one, but you can't count it. Perhaps being 'unified' and being a 'unity' are different? |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6 | |
A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved. |