8 ideas
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
| From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
| 14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The 'standard' view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, is that we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order (which works for examples like 'loves' and 'between'). | |
| From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The point of Fine's paper is that there are many relations for which this model seems to fail. |
| 14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved'] | |
| From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places. |
| 14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata? | |
| From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1) | |
| A reaction: He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation. |
| 14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Roads in the directional sense (A-to-B or B-to-A) are merely roads in the adirectional sense up which a direction has been imposed. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1) | |
| A reaction: This is Fine's linguistic objection to the standard view of relations. It is undeniable that language imposes an order where it may not exist ('Bob and Jane play tennis'), and this fact is very significant in discussing relations. |
| 14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A 'biased' relation can be taken to be the result of imposing ordering on the argument-places of an unbiased relation, ..or we can take an unbiased relation to be a 'permutation class' of biased relations. This is a familiar metaphysic predicament. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 3) | |
| A reaction: 'Biased' relations such as 'on top of' have an ordering to their places, but 'unbiased' relations such as 'vertical placement' do not. This is a nice question in the metaphysics of grounding relations between key concepts. |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Cratylus was appalled that Heraclitus said you could not step twice into the same river, because it was already going too far to admit stepping into the same river once. | |
| From: report of Cratylus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1010a | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 427. |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Cratylus thought speech of any kind was radically inappropriate and that expression should be restricted exclusively to the movement of the finger. | |
| From: report of Cratylus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1010a |