Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' and 'On Certainty'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14
     A reaction: A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Wittgenstein remarked that if you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §114)
     A reaction: A wonderfully challenging aphorism. I suspect that it is true, but not really a problem. We all know the meaning of 'Loch Ness Monster', as long as we don't get too fussy. And for local objects I am happy that I know the facts.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
4375 Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
     From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
     A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.