Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Properties' and 'The DhammaPada'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1)
     A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view?
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
     Full Idea: Three main reasons for thinking properties exist: the one-over-many argument (that a type can have many tokens), the reference argument (to understand predicates and singular terms), and the quantification argument (that we quantify over them).
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 1.1)
     A reaction: [Bits in brackets are compressions of his explanations]. I don't find any of these remotely persuasive. Why would we infer how the world is, simply from how we talk about or reason about the world? His first reason is the only interesting one.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
     Full Idea: The Quinean claims that the application of a predicate cannot, in principle, be explained - it is a 'primitive' fact.
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 4.4)
     A reaction: I am not clear what 'principle' could endorse this claim. There just seems to be a possible failure of all the usual attempts at explaining predication.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
     Full Idea: For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson.
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2)
     A reaction: If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
     Full Idea: The view of 'priority monism' - that the whole is prior to its parts - is controversial, but has been growing in support
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.4.4)
     A reaction: The simple and plausible thought is, I take it, that parts only count as parts when a whole comes into existence, so a whole is needed to generate parts. Thus the whole must be prior to the parts. Fine by me.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170)
     A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5)
     A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods?
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186)
     A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121)
     A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery.
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122)
     A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61)
     A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224)
     A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself?