|
18946
|
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
|
|
Full Idea:
As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
|
|
From:
Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
|
|
A reaction:
Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
|
|
16616
|
Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
|
|
From:
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
|
|
A reaction:
This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
|
|
16585
|
Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
|
|
Full Idea:
Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
|
|
From:
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
|
|
A reaction:
This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
|
|
2427
|
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
|
|
Full Idea:
Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
|
|
From:
report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
|
|
A reaction:
I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.
|
|
7390
|
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
|
|
From:
comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
|
|
A reaction:
In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.
|