18946
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Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
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Full Idea:
As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
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From:
Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
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A reaction:
Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
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21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
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From:
report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
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A reaction:
I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.
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13804
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A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties.
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13806
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Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
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A reaction:
He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence.
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13809
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One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
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A reaction:
Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.
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