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All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'The Metaphysics of Modality' and 'The Theodicy'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: No metaphysical account which renders it impossible to give a plausible epistemological theory is to be countenanced.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.1)
     A reaction: It is hard to object to this principle, though we certainly don't want to go verificationist, and thus rule out speculations about metaphysics which are beyond any possible knowledge. Some have tried to prove that something must exist (e.g. Jacquette).
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
19335 Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All reasonings are eminent in God, and they preserve an order among themselves in his understanding as well as in ours; but for him this is just an order and a priority of nature, whereas for us there is a priority of time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.192), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: This view is found in Frege, and seems to be the hallmark of rationalist philosophy. There is an apriori assumption that reality has a rational order, so that pure reason is a tool for grasping it. Lewis's 'mosaic' of experiences has no order.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: We use the symbol 'ι' (Greek 'iota') to form definite descriptions, reading (ιx)F(x) as 'the x which is such that F(x)', or simply as 'the F'.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.1)
     A reaction: Compare the lambda operator in modal logic, which picks out predicates from similar formulae.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: It is very plausible that the sorites paradoxes arose from the application of a semantic apparatus appropriate only for sharp predicates to languages containing vague predicates (rather than from deficiency of meaning, or from incoherence).
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.3)
     A reaction: Sounds wrong. Of course, logic has been designed for sharp predicates, and natural languages are awash with vagueness. But the problems of vagueness bothered lawyers long before logicians like Russell began to worry about it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: For each instance of identity or failure of identity, there must be facts in virtue of which that instance obtains. ..Enough has been said to lend this doctrine some plausibility.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.5)
     A reaction: Penelope Mackie picks this out from Forbes as a key principle. It sounds to be in danger of circularity, unless the 'facts' can be cited without referring to, or implicitly making use of, identities - which seems unlikely.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: If we imagine a possible world in which two clocks in a room make one clock from half the parts of each, the judgement 'these two actual clocks could have been a single clock' does not seem wholly false.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.4)
     A reaction: You would, of course, have sufficient parts left over to make a second clock, so they look like a destroyed clock, so I don't think I find Forbes's intuition on this one very persuasive.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Forbes argues that, unless we posit individual essences, we cannot guarantee that identities across possible worlds will be appropriately grounded in other properties.
     From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.4
     A reaction: There is a confrontation between Wiggins, who says identity is primitive, and Forbes, who says identity must be grounded in other properties. I think I side with Forbes.
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: An individual essence of an object x is a set of properties I which satisfies the following conditions: i. every property P in I is an essential property of x; ii. it is not possible that some object y distinct from x has every member of I.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: I am coming to the view that stable natural kinds (like electrons or gold) do not have individual essences, but complex kinds (like tigers or tables) do. The view is based on the idea that explanatory power is what individuates an essence.
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: A non-trivial individual essence is properties other than a) those following from a de dicto truth, b) properties of existence and self-identity (or their cognates), c) properties derived from necessities in some other category.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: [I have compressed Forbes] Rather than adding all these qualificational clauses to our concept, we could just tighten up on the notion of a property, saying it is something which is causally efficacious, and hence explanatory.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The essential properties of a thing will typically depend upon what category of thing it is, and perhaps also on some more particular facts about the thing itself.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: I see no way of dispensing with the second requirement, in the cases of complex entities like animals. If all samples are the same, then of course we can define a sample's essence through its kind, but not if samples differ in any way.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: An essential property of an object x is a property without possessing which x could not exist.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: This is certainly open to question. See Joan Kung's account of Aristotle on essence. I am necessarily more than eight years old (now), and couldn't exist without that property, but is the property part of my essence?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Artefacts can be ascribed fuzzy essences. ...We might say that it is essential to an artefact to have 'most' of its parts.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.6)
     A reaction: I think I prefer to accept the idea that essences are unstable things, in all cases. For all we know, electrons might subtly change their general character, or cease to be uniform, tomorrow. Essences explain, and what needs explaining changes.
12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity of artefacts at a world, since the very same parts may turn up at different times as the parts of artefacts with different designs and functions.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.2)
     A reaction: Thus the Ship of Theseus could be dismantled and turned into a barn (as happened with the 'Mayflower'). They could then be reconstituted as the ship, which would then have two beginnings (as Chris Hughes has pointed out).
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: In the time of a single world, the same individual can undergo a change of sex, but it is less clear that an individual of one sex could have been, from the outset, an individual of another.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.5)
     A reaction: I don't find this support for essentiality of origin very persuasive. I struggle with these ideas. Given my sex yesterday, then presumably I couldn't have had a different sex yesterday. Given that pigs can fly, pigs can fly. What am I missing?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Forbes has two principles of identity, which we can call the No Bare Identities Principle (identities hold in virtue of other facts), and the No Extrinsic Determination Principle (that only intrinsic facts of a thing establish identity).
     From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 127-8) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.7
     A reaction: The job of the philosopher is to prise apart the real identities of things from the way in which we conceive of identities. I take these principles to apply to real identities, not conceptual identities.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The difference between de re and de dicto formulae is a difference between formulae which are, and formulae which are not, sensitive to the identities of objects at various worlds.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.1)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4)
     A reaction: [Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: There is no means by which we might distinguish a possible world from what is true at it. ...Whereas our ability to separate a place, or a time, from its occupier is crucial to realism about places and times, as is a distance relation.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2)
     A reaction: He is objecting to Lewis's modal realism. I'm not fully convinced. It depends whether we are discussing real ontology or conceptual space. In the latter I see no difference between times and possible worlds. In ontology, a 'time' is weird.
12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The main objection to realism about worlds is from epistemology. Knowledge of properties of objects requires experience of these objects, which must be within the range of our sensory faculties, but only concrete actual objects achieve that.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2)
     A reaction: This pinpoints my dislike of the whole possible worlds framework, ontologically speaking. I seem to be an actualist. I take possibilities to be inferences to the best explanation from the powers we know of in the actual world. We experience potentiality.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Someone impressed by the parallel between tense and modal operators ...might suggest that just as we can speak of places and times forming their own manifolds or spaces, so we can say that worlds are the points of logical space.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2)
     A reaction: I particularly like the notion of worlds being "points of logical space", and am inclined to remove it from this context and embrace it as the correct way to understand possible worlds. We must understand logical or conceptual space.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: An elucidation of transworld identity can be regarded as an elucidation of the boundaries of possibility for ordinary things.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: I presume that if we don't search for some such criterion, we just have to face the possibility that Aristotle could have been a poached egg in some possible world. To know the bounds of possibility, study the powers of actual objects.
12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The motivation for investigating individual essences should be obvious, since if every object has such an essence, the problem of elucidating transworld identity can be solved.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
     A reaction: It is important that, if necessary, the identities be 'individual', and not just generic, by sortal, or natural kind. We want to reason about (and explain) truths at the fine-grained level of the individual, not just at the broad level of generalisation.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The outstanding technical objection to counterpart-theoretic semantics concerns its handling of the logic of identity. In quantified S5 (the orthodox semantics) a = b → □(a = b) is valid, but 'a' must not attach to two objects.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.5)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness, as opposed to the sort of essentialism that gives non-trivial conditions sufficient for transworld identity.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.6)
     A reaction: 'Haecceitism' is the doctrine that things have primitive identity. A 'haecceity' is a postulated property which actually does the job. The key point of the view is that whatever it is is 'primitive', and not complex, or analysable. I don't believe it.
12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The natural response to an unreasonable hypothesis of possibility for an object x, that in such a state of affairs it would not be x which satisfies the conditions, is evidence that we do possess concepts of thisness for individuals.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4)
     A reaction: We may have a 'concept' of thisness, but we needn't be committed to the 'existence' of a thisness. There is a fairly universal intuition that cessation of existence of an entity when it starts to change can be a very vague matter.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
19367 Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: As for volition itself, to say that it is the object of free will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will, else we should still say we will to have the will to will, and that would go on to infinity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.151), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV
     A reaction: This strikes me as an elementary difficulty which most fans of free will appear to evade. Thoughts just arise in us, and some of them are volitions. We can say there is then a 'gap' (Searle) where we choose, but what happens in the gap?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
19351 Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Insofar as the soul has perfection ...God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders. Insofar as it is imperfect and confused, God accommodates soul to body, swayed by passions.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.159), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 3.IV
     A reaction: Perkins says this is the nearest Leibniz gets to the idea of interaction between body and soul. Perfection and confusion are on a continuum for Leibniz. With such speculations I always wonder how these things can be known. How perfect is my mind?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
19331 Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One may say that 'will' consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it contains.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: This emphasises that the will is faced with options, rather than generating the options. The context is a discussion of the nature of God's will. I think 'will' is a really useful concept, and dislike the Hobbesian rejection of will.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
19346 Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil, provided that it were not the same kind.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.130), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Nice challenge. People who refuse the offer are not necessarily suicidal. He's probably right, but Leibniz doesn't recognise the factor of boredom. Look up the suicide note of the actor George Sanders! One life may be enough.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
19340 Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically, and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil is suffering, and moral evil is sin.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: There seem to be plenty of imperfections in the world which don't look like evil. Or do you only declare it to be an imperfection because it seems to be evil (by some other standard)? Human evil comes from ignorance, so metaphysical explains moral.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
19366 You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled by one's evil qualities; assessing actions without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.426), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV
     A reaction: Mill tries to separate judgement of the agent from judgement of the consequences of the action, but I think Leibniz has spotted that just judging outcomes ceases to be a 'moral' judgement.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
19326 God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The cause of the world must be intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of worlds being equally possible, with equal claim to existence, the cause of the world must have regarded all of these worlds to fix on one of them.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: A wonderfully Leibnizian way of putting what looks like the design argument.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
19327 The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Also, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.128), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Notice that Leibniz's possible worlds seem to be all connected together, unlike David Lewis's worlds, which are discrete. Personally I suspect that all perfections will lead to contradiction, though Leibniz strongly argues against it.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
19344 God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is certain that God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be said with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.189), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Lovely problems arise when you guess at God's values! We have the same problem. Would you kill a poacher who was wiping out the last remaining lions? How many lions would you kill to save a human?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
19330 If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The three dogmas (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) it is fixed, but not certain God will observe it, or (3) the justice we know is not that which God observes, destroy our confidence in the love of God.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.237), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: Leibniz proceeds to carefully refute these three responses to the dilemma about how justice relates to God.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
19325 God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: God is the first reason of things: all that we see and experience is contingent and nothing in them renders their existence necessary.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.127), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Perkins presents this as the first step in one of Leibniz's arguments for God. They all seem to be variants of the ontological argument. [His 'Theodicy' is the Huggard translation, 1985] This resembles Aquinas's Third Way.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
19329 The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: These admirable laws [of physics] are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato and Spinoza.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.332), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
     A reaction: Note the swipe at Spinoza. Leibniz defends the absolute necessities residing in God, but is too polite to call those 'brute', though personally I can't see the difference. But he says the laws arise from 'perfection and order', not from God's necessity.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
19437 Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Not only cares and labours but also prayers are useful; God having had these prayers in view before he regulated things.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], Abridge III)
     A reaction: Hm. I'm struggling with this one. So I can't skip prayers today, because God has foreseen them and included them in his great plan? Hard to motivate yourself, like starting a game of chess after you've already been declared the winner.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
19337 How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is this question of natural theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.098), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: His answer is, roughly, that there is an unavoidable trade-off, which humans cannot fully understand. Personally I would say that if there is a God, the evidence for his benevolence towards humanity is not encouraging.
19345 Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and justice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our gaze.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.120), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
     A reaction: Hm. If this locality is full of evils, and the rest of it is much better, how come we are stuck in this miserable corner of things? God is obliged to compromise, but did he select us to get the worst of it?