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18946
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Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
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Full Idea:
As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
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From:
Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
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A reaction:
Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
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13804
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A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties.
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13806
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Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
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A reaction:
He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence.
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13809
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One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
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Full Idea:
In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.
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From:
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
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A reaction:
Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.
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6213
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A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
The will is not voluntary: for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word 'will', which is absurd and insignificant.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.XII.5)
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A reaction:
A nice simple point, allied to Nietzsche's notion that thoughts are uncontrollable (Idea 2291). Even Aquinas, who is quite a fan of free will, spotted the problem (Idea 1854). Personally I agree with Hobbes. Free will is a shibboleth.
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6210
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Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
For an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.6)
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A reaction:
Kant's definition of happiness (Idea 1452) seems to be the underlying idea, and hence with the same implication (of impossibility). However, an alcoholic locked in a brewery would seem to have all that Hobbes requires for happiness.
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6212
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Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
Lust consists of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased, and the delight men take in delighting is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX)
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A reaction:
Hobbes would rather burst a blood-vessel than admit any altruism. If you take pleasure in pleasing someone else, why can't that simply be because of the other person's pleasure, with which we sympathise, rather than relishing our own 'power'?
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