Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'works' and 'On the Heavens'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
     Full Idea: If even a single person is completely convinced of his philosophy; ...if his free judgement in philosophising, and what life obtrudes upon him, are perfectly in accord; then in this person philosophy has completed its circuit and attained its goal.
     From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:512), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.4
     A reaction: Interesting to hear a famous idealist offering accordance with real life as a criterion for philosophical success. But that is real life, but not as you and I may know it.... His criterion is very subjective. A bad philosopher might attain it?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason'.
     From: report of Johann Fichte (works [1798]) by Ludwig Feuerbach - Principles of Philosophy of the Future §17
     A reaction: Fichte was not an atheist, but this seems to be a supreme aphorism for summarising our image of the Englightenment. Personally I subscribe to the Enlightenment ideal (the best life is the rational life), despite doubts about 'pure' reason.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33)
     A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan).
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Fichte retained a broadly Kantian conception of how things are in themselves.
     From: report of Johann Fichte (works [1798]) by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.2
     A reaction: The contrast is between those who believe in the thing-in-itself, while admitting that we can't know it, and those who deny such a thing. The debate returned 130 years later as verificationism in language.
We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
     Full Idea: We can abandon the thing-in-itself, and aim for 'a complete deduction of all experience from the possibility of self-consciousness'.
     From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I p.425), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: German Idealism now looks to me like a weird abberation in the history of philosophy, though no doubt it has (like every philosophical theory) some supporters out there somewhere. Schopenhauer called this 'raving nonsense'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
     Full Idea: Fichte's very influential idea is that the subject becomes divided against itself. The absolute I splits into an I (consciousness) and a not-I (the objective world) that are relative to each other.
     From: report of Johann Fichte (works [1798]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 3 'Fichtean'
     A reaction: This is German Idealism in action. Is there a before and after the split here? I can't make much sense of this idea. It is said that babies spend a while deciding which bits are them and which aren't. There is more to the world than 'not-I'.
Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Not by any law of nature do we attain to reason; we achieve it by absolute freedom. ...In philosophy, therefore, we must necessarily start from the self. The materialists' project of deriving the appearance of reason from natural laws is impossible.
     From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:298), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics
     A reaction: I blame Descartes' Cogito for this misunderstanding. The underlying idea (in Kant, and probably earlier) is that pure reason needs pure free will. Modern thought usually sees reason as extremely impure.
Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
     Full Idea: We must be rid of the thing-in-itself; for whatever we may think, we are that which thinks therein, and hence nothing could ever come to exist independently of us, for everything is necessarily related to our thinking.
     From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:501), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.3
     A reaction: Some statements of idealism are understandable, or even quite plausible, but this one sounds ridiculous. The idea that if human beings die out then reality ceases to exist is absurd humanistic vanity.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
     Full Idea: Spinoza could only think his philosophy, not believe it, for it stood in immediate contradiction to his necessary conviction in daily life, whereby he was bound to regard himself as free and independent.
     From: Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:513), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.2
     A reaction: This seems to be invoking Kant's idea that we must presuppose free will, rather than an assertion that we actually have it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08)
     A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33)
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines.
     From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2
     A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve.
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1
     A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move?
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24)
     A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29)
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26)