13 ideas
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro) | |
| A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example. |
| 14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
| A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens. |
| 14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way. |
| 14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46) | |
| A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood. |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
| From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
| 14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of? |
| 14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts. |
| 14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me. |
| 14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
| A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars. |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view. |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence? |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view. |
| 14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea. |