10 ideas
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic. |
19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept. |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |