Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', ''Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy' and 'Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber]
     Full Idea: There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected and organised for expository purposes.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.72), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber urged some objectivity by not judging agents' goals. Also see Idea 22367
The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber]
     Full Idea: Cultural sciences do not have results which are 'subjective' and only valid for one person and not others. ...For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.84), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber said that although research interests are subjective, the social causes discovered can be objective.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Chihara proposes to replace all sets by reference to the open sentences that define them.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle [1973]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4
     A reaction: This depends on predicativism, because that stipulates the definitions will be available (cos if it ain't definable it ain't there). Chihara went on to define the open sentences in terms of the possibility of uttering them. Cf. propositional functions.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.