Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Elements of Intuitionism' and 'Freedom and Action'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The platonist destroys the whole essence of infinity, which lies in the conception of a structure which is always in growth, precisely because the process of construction is never completed.
     From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism [1977], p.57), quoted by Thomas J. McKay - Plural Predication
     A reaction: I don't warm to intuitionism, but I warm to this conception of infinity. Completed infinities are convenient reifications for mathematicians.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett]
     Full Idea: For an intuitionist a mathematical statement is rendered true or false by a proof or disproof, that is, by a construction, and constructions are effected in time.
     From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism [1977], p.336), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2
     A reaction: Lavine is quoting this to draw attention to the difficulties of thinking of it as all taking place 'in time', especially when dealing with infinities.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
     A reaction: This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
     A reaction: I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.