Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4988 Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
     From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9
     A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.
4987 Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
     A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
6866 It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
6867 Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
     A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
6865 A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?