Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Nietzsche's Immoralism' and 'Investigations into Logical Deduction'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18946	Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
	Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
	From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
	A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction

13832	Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking]
	Full Idea: Gentzen thought that his natural deduction gets at the heart of logical reasoning, and used the sequent calculus only as a convenient tool for proving his chief results.
	From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (Investigations into Logical Deduction [1935]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §05

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

22474	Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
	Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible.
	From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154)
	A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice

22472	The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
	Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.
	From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)
	A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.