Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Heidegger: an introduction' and 'Opus Maius (major works)'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics

15575	Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt]
	Full Idea: Thanks to Heidegger, hermeneutics has gained wider acceptance - that knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations.
	From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 3.§7)
	A reaction: I am not sure if I understand the notion of a search that has a refusal to actually find anything as one of its basic principles.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18946	Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
	Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
	From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
	A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

15568	When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt]
	Full Idea: We would hardly want to say that a possibility is nothing, since surely we are considering something when we consider possibilities.
	From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 1)
	A reaction: A nice contribution to the issue of whether modality is a feature of actuality. I would prefer to say that we can self-evidently utter truths and falsehoods about what is or is not possible, in nature, in logic, and maybe in metaphysics.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences

16745	No one even knows the nature and properties of a fly - why it has that colour, or so many feet [Bacon,R]
	Full Idea: No one is so wise regarding the natural world as to know with certainty all the truths that concern the nature and properties of a single fly, or to know the proper causes of its color and why it has so many feet, neither more nor less.
	From: Roger Bacon (Opus Maius (major works) [1254], I.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
	A reaction: Pasnau quotes this in the context of 'occult' qualities. It is scientific essentialism, because Bacon clearly takes it that the explanation of these things would be found within the essence of the fly, if we could only get at it.