Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Meaning and Necessity' and 'Positions'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
     Full Idea: Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes.
     From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76)
     A reaction: This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
     Full Idea: I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution.
     From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40)
     A reaction: [I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting...
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
     Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
     From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
     A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]
     Full Idea: Carnap's proposal is to understand the category of intensions appropriate to sentences (his 'propositions') as sets of possible worlds. The intension of the sentence is taken as the set of all possible worlds in which the sentence is true.
     From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Meaning and Necessity [1947]) by David Kaplan - Transworld Heir Lines p.90
     A reaction: [reference?] This extension of the truth-conditions view of meaning strikes me as being very attractive. Except that whole worlds hardly seem to be relevant to my remark about how lunch might have been improved.