13 ideas
21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Hamann, Herder and Jacobi are central figues in the reaction against Enlightenment. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 'immediate') | |
A reaction: From a British perspective I would see Hume as the leading such figure. Hamann emphasised the neglect of the role of language. Jacobi was a Christian. |
21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Kant's Critique swiftly brought rationalism to a halt, and after Kant empiricism has displayed a nervousness regarding its foundations, and been forced to assume more sophisticated forms. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 Intro) | |
A reaction: See the ideas of Laurence Bonjour for a modern revival of rationalism. After Kant philosophers either went existential, or stared gloomily into the obscure depths. Formal logic was seen as a possible rope ladder down. |
21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Apart from Hegel, no later philosophical system equals in stature Kant's attempt to weld together the diverse fields of natural science, morality, politics, aesthetics and religion into a systematic overarching epistemological and metaphysical unity. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10) | |
A reaction: Earlier candidate are Plato and Aristotle. Earlier Enlightenment figures say little about morality or aesthetics. Hobbes ranges widely. Aquinas covered most things. |
21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
Full Idea: A transcendental proof converts a possibility into a necessity: by saying under what conditions experience of objects is possible, transcendental proofs show those conditions to be necessary for us to the extent that we have any experience of objects. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 02 'Transc') | |
A reaction: They appear to be hypothetical necessities, rather than true metaphysical necessities. Gardner is discussing Kant, but seems to be generalising. Hypothetical necessities are easy: if it is flying, it is necessarily above the ground. |
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible. | |
From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'. |
21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
Full Idea: There is now 'pure' geometry, consisting of formal systems based on axioms for which truth is not claimed, and which are consequently not synthetic; and 'applied', a branch of physics, the truth of which is empirical, and therefore not a priori. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 03 'Maths') | |
A reaction: His point is that there is no longer any room for a priori geometry. Might the same division be asserted of arithmetic, or analysis, or set theory? |
21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Leibnizian monads clearly satisfy Kant's definition of noumena. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 06 'Noumena') | |
A reaction: This needs qualifying, because Leibniz clearly specifies the main attributes of monads, where Kant is adamant that we can saying virtually nothing about noumena. |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II) | |
A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity. |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9) | |
A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck. |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay? |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V) | |
A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like. |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'. |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'. |