Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics'' and 'Form, Matter and Substance'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

24069	Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality.
	From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro)
	A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

18946	Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
	Full Idea: As speakers of the language, we unreflectively assume that there are nonexistents, and that reference to them is possible.
	From: Marga Reimer (The Problem of Empty Names [2001], p.499), quoted by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4
	A reaction: Sarah Swoyer quotes this as a good solution to the problem of empty names, and I like it. It introduces a two-tier picture of our understanding of the world, as 'unreflective' and 'reflective', but that seems good. We accept numbers 'unreflectively'.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

24065	Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki]
	Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts.
	From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro)
	A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

24066	The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities.
	From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1)
	A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

24067	Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
	Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities.
	From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3)
	A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

22109	The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
	Full Idea: Having 'scientia' is the fullest possible human cognition, by which one situates the fact expressed by a conclusion in an explanatory theory that accurately maps metaphysical or physical reality.
	From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics' [1269], 1.2.9, 1.5.7) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
	A reaction: That is a perfect statement of my concept of knowledge. Explanatory theories must specify the essential natures of the entities involved. We don't aim for 'knowledge', we aim for the 'fullest possible cognition'. This account extend's Aristotle's.