10 ideas
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36) | |
| A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?). |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32) | |
| A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain. |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34) | |
| A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing. |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
| 22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
| Full Idea: The works we tend to value most highly are ones that are in sympathy with the moral views we actually accept. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I would have to endorse this. She admits that we may rate other works very highly, but they won't appear on our list of favourites. This fact may well distort philosophical discussions of morality and art. |
| 22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
| Full Idea: Our responses to literature should show that we grasp whatever counts as morally important within the narrative, but not necessarily that we judge and feel in the way deemed appropriate by the work. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Accommodating') | |
| A reaction: She gives as an example a story by Hemingway which places a high value on the courageous hunting of big game. A second example is the total amorality of a Highsmith novel. This idea seems exactly right to me. |
| 22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
| Full Idea: Moral value is valuable in art because people care about moral value. This runs deep, but it is a contingent matter, and the value of morality in art hinges on art's need to provide something precious to us. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Contingency') | |
| A reaction: I think this is exactly right. Thrillers are written with very little moral concern, for a readership which cares about brave and exciting deeds. Even there, violence has its ethics. |
| 22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
| Full Idea: A work that rejects moral truth can be artistically excellent, in part because of its moral content. | |
| From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intr) | |
| A reaction: She cites the film 'Trainspotting', about desperate drug addicts, because it gives an amoral insight into their world. |