8 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2 |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6 |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1 | |
A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates. |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts. |