5 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities. ..They are not defined by Dedekind cuts; rather, the cuts constitute a domain with the properties that are a necessary precondition. | |
From: report of Bob Hale (Reals by Abstraction [1998]) by B Hale / C Wright - Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' 3.3 | |
A reaction: This is Hale's neo-logicist attempt to derive the real numbers from Hume's Principle. |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |