Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Time', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'Animal Rights and Wrongs'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


77 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead?
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07)
     A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7
     A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1
     A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
     A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
     Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04
     A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'.
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4
     A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4
     A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that.
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04)
     A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't?
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41)
     A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore.
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5
     A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community.
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology'
     A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence?
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron.
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre.
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1
     A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
     A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
     A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all!
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
     Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15)
     A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
     Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15)
     A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10)
     A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit].
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15)
     A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14)
     A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3
     A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual'
     A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a)
     A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology).
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1
     A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226
     A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved!
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
     Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3
     A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13)
     A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.23)
     A reaction: Not a point that would trouble an eliminativist, as it sounds suspiciously circular or question-begging.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.28)
     A reaction: Interesting. I don't believe Roman legislators invented it, so where did it originate? Interesting that it is legalistic - a thing to which rights can accrue. Compare character, to which virtues accrue.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27)
     A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09
     A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Conditioning involves a change of behaviour, but not necessarily a change of mind.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16)
     A reaction: I am inclined to doubt this. If I was conditioned in some way, I would expect my conscious state to change as well as my behaviour.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
     Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17)
     A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling?
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30
     A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19)
     A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
     A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The three forms of moral life (respect for persons, the pursuit of virtue and natural sympathy) all depend, in the last analysis, on piety, which is the deep-down recognition of our frailty and dependence.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.56)
     A reaction: MacIntyre agrees. 'Piety' is an odd word, which attempts to link the point to religious teachings. 'Dependence' seems an adequate term. But can fully independent creatures dispense with morality? I think not.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing'
     A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey).
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
     Full Idea: We can see the Kantian 'Moral Law' as consisting precisely in those rules which rational beings would accept, when attempting to live by agreement.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.30)
     A reaction: If this combines Kantian notions of duty with the obligations of contracts, it is the core of a very powerful moral theory. See the work of Tim Scanlon. Classic problems are still the weak, animals and free riders.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33)
     A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61)
     A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
     Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54)
     A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
     Full Idea: That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.86)
     A reaction: The problem cases all arise in wartime. Ideally we want to show sympathy even when being necessarily ruthless, but in practice we send the callous ones to do the horrible deed.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
     Full Idea: As soon as we set our own interests aside and look on human relations with the eye of the impartial judge, we find ourselves agreeing over the rights and wrongs of any conflict.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.59)
     A reaction: A nice, and fairly plausible, defence of Kantian ethics. Maybe the UN should actually settle all disputes, instead of just peace-keeping. The idea merely describes the function of the law, and especially an independent judiciary.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Utilitarian thinking does not replace or compete with the moral law, but guides us when the moral law is silent and only sympathy speaks.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.63)
     A reaction: If the moral law is silent, it is not quite clear why we should follow sympathy rather than contempt. There is the well-known danger here of the moral law turning out to lack content.
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is nearer the truth to see morality as setting the limits to practical reasoning, rather than being a species of it. Moral principles tell us precisely that we must go no further along the path of calculation.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52)
     A reaction: Well said. If you are assessing whether an act of vicious brutality is required, you have probably already gone morally astray. It is not hard, though, to think of counterexamples, especially in wartime.
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Stalin and Hitler justified their actions in utilitarian terms, ..and no one can accuse them, for who knows what the long-term effects of their actions might be? But a morality which can't pass final judgement on Hitler or Stalin is a kind of sick joke.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.52)
     A reaction: A powerful argument against simplistic consequentialism. We can judge an action at any time, even beforehand, and that must be part of morality, which can't just observe the unfolding consequences.
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It was precisely the inability of utilitarianism to explain the distinction between animals and people which led to its rejection.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.50)
     A reaction: A nice turning of the tables, rejecting the utilitarian pride in incorporating animals into their theory where others (like Kant) reject them. Yet in one respect (suffering) they are inescapably very like us.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54)
     A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40)
     A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally.
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
     Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7
     A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy.
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
     Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling).
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227
     A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia).
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5
     A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
     Full Idea: We don't give help to British animals (through the RSPCA) rather than foreign animals because of their nearness or needs, but because of our sense of them as fellow citizens.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.104)
     A reaction: A bit strong. It may, in fact, be because we look after them the way we look after the rest of our property. Even Kantians can be sentimental sometimes.
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that the concept of intentionality introduces the first genuine claim of animals upon our sympathies and our moral concern.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.16)
     A reaction: Good. If one's approach to morality is Humean (via sympathy) this seems right. Utilitarianism bases animal rights on qualia (pleasures and pains).
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There is a difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats, and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87)
     A reaction: There are areas in the middle, where I encourage pheasants to breed 'wild' on my land. The purchase of a Rottweiller also tests the moral boundaries here.
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Most of the stranger forms of life (worms, fleas, locusts etc.) are not really suitors for our moral concern, and interest us primarily as species, and only rarely as individuals.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.13)
     A reaction: Interesting, but that seems to reflect on us, rather than cutting nature at the joints. As soon as you look closely, you recognise an individual rather than a member of a species.
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
     Full Idea: An animal has acquired individuality if the gift of a proper name seems appropriate, the high point being reached with animals such as dogs which actually respond to their own name.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.39)
     A reaction: Interesting, even though it is rather chauvinistic. I might name the fleas in my circus, but regard a whole section of the human race as indistinguishable and not worth naming.
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
     Full Idea: I instinctively recoil from stepping on a spider or a forget-me-knot in my path, but neither of these responses expresses the fellow-feeling that forbids me to step on a rabbit or a mouse.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.41)
     A reaction: It is fellow-feeling that makes us prefer mammals to reptiles. It seems wrong to build a moral system purely on empathy, because psychopaths don't even empathise with nice human beings. Externalism in morality.
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Lucky animals die in the jaws of a large predator; predators themselves are less lucky, when they die of lingering starvation; least fortunate are those killed by smaller creatures, such as maggots and bacteria.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.43)
     A reaction: A nice insight, even if it does slide into claiming that we are simply large predators, and that therefore fox-hunting is a virtue…
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is easy to remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but the result is not a life which an animal should lead.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.44)
     A reaction: I'm not clear where the "should" derives from here. You can't save them all, and large interventions would destroy the ecosystem. But should we never, say, put a victim out of its misery?
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Sheep and beef cattle live a quiet and comfortable life among their companions, and are despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.81)
     A reaction: No rational person could envy a premature death, and we don't wait for cattle to be old before eating them. A quick death is little consolation for being murdered, and many people would prefer a slower death (without agony, of course).
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Too much concern for individual animals may in fact harm the species, by promoting diseased or degenerate members, or preventing population control.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.87)
     A reaction: Okay till we reach human beings, where this principle won't go away, even if further principles about personhood, rationality and deep sympathy enter the picture. We can't be utilitarian about animals, and something else about humans.
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Animals exist outside the web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by dialogue, but because they have no rights it does not mean that we have no duties towards them.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.97)
     A reaction: The modern Kantian view of animals, though Kant struggled to show why we might have any duties to animals. Is mere compassion enough to produce a duty, or is it a luxurious indulgence of our nature?
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Dog-fights and bear-baiting are naturally forbidden by law, because they threaten the personality of those who attend them.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.107)
     A reaction: Hm. If this is so, it is mainly because it takes place in a closed pen, where we can get a close look at the brutality and blood. It could be said to be more honest than hunting with gun or hounds. 'Go on eyes, look your worst'.
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.75)
     A reaction: He is talking about race horses and St Bernards. This doesn't avoid the moral dilemma, because we could race horses die out if we thought we had created a bad life for them.
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.91)
     A reaction: Good point. If we assume that culling is required at all, then the decisive human actions which shock us on television may be nicer than the natural deaths that occur during the night.